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GULLY AND THE FAILURE TO STAKE A 28 U.S.C. § 1331
“CLAIM”
Lumen N. Mulligan *
Abstract: In this piece, I argue that a return to Gully v. First National Bank in Meridian as
an approach to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 jurisdiction is ill-conceived. In a recent thoughtful article,
Professor Simona Grossi draws heavily upon the traditions of the legal process school’s
approach to federal courts jurisprudence to support just such a resurrection of Gully as the
lodestar for § 1331 doctrine. While embracing a return to the legal process school, I argue
first that the Gully view—read as a call for judges simply to select sufficiently important
matters, in relation to plaintiff’s case in chief, for inclusion in federal question jurisdiction—
does not have a unique affinity to legal-process-school jurisprudential norms. To the
contrary, legal-process-school principles support a more traditional rights-and-causes-ofaction approach to § 1331 doctrine, understood as a means of effectuating the principle of
congressional control over lower federal court jurisdiction. Second, I contend that Gully,
understood as espousing a transaction or claim-centric approach to § 1331, lays a poor
foundation for this doctrine. Indeed, this interpretation of Gully is both inaccurate and
anachronistic. In this same vein, I note that the Supreme Court’s contemporary use of the
term “claim” subsumes the very notions of right and cause of action that the claim-centric
view aims to avoid, and that a claim-centered view is likely to cause more practical havoc
than help. Finally, I argue that this return to Gully is more emblematic of a pragmatic
approach to § 1331 jurisdictional law, which I reject within the confines of the broader
contemporary discussion regarding the role of “simple” versus “complex” jurisdictional
regimes.
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INTRODUCTION
In a recent thought-provoking piece, Professor Simona Grossi argues
from a legal-process-school point of view that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 doctrine
should be re-constructed in light of Gully v. First National Bank in
Meridian. 1 She contends that this Gully-inspired approach clarifies
federal question jurisdiction law when read either as a call for judges
simply to select sufficiently important matters, in relation to plaintiff’s
case in chief, for inclusion in federal question jurisdiction or when read
in terms of “claims,” 2 a concept that she defines “by reference to the
facts that establish a legal right to relief” as that concept is used in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and contemporary res judicata law.3 In
this piece, I praise Grossi’s renewed focus on legal-process-school
norms. Indeed, based upon her call to return to our legal-process roots, I
contend that my past work in the § 1331 canon is consistent with these
jurisprudential norms. Nevertheless, I argue that neither Gully,
interpreted as requiring judges to select sufficiently important matters
for jurisdictional purposes, nor the concept of claim can serve as useful
tools for interpreting the § 1331 canon.
I begin with a brief primer on § 1331 doctrine. In 1875, Congress
passed the first general grant of federal question jurisdiction, now
codified in § 1331. 4 Even though the language of § 1331 parallels that of
1. 299 U.S. 109 (1936).
2. Simona Grossi, A Modified Theory of the Law of Federal Courts: The Case of Arising Under
Jurisdiction, 88 WASH. L. REV. 961, 982 (2013).
3. Id.
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000). This statute has not always been codified here. Nevertheless, I do not
employ the cumbersome “predecessor statute to § 1331” locution when referring to cases dealing
with the Act as codified in a different location. Instead, I simply refer to this Act as § 1331, even if
at a previous time it was codified at a different location. This approach is sound because, excepting
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Article III of the Constitution, modern Supreme Court opinions
consistently hold that § 1331 federal question jurisdiction is not identical
in scope to the constitutional federal question jurisdiction provision. 5
Indeed, the modern Court interprets § 1331 as granting a much narrower
scope of jurisdiction than the Constitution permits. 6 In furtherance of
this generally restrictive interpretive principle, all § 1331 jurisdictional
cases are subject to the well-pleaded complaint rule. 7 Following this
rule, only federal issues raised in a plaintiff’s complaint, not anticipated
defenses, establish federal question jurisdiction. 8
Doctrinal orthodoxy further maintains that the Court has since
established two independent and irreconcilable tests for determining
when a complaint raises a well-pleaded federal question. According to
the black-letter view, the overwhelming majority of federal question
cases 9 vest under § 1331 because federal law—be it by statute, treaty,
Constitution or federal common law 10—creates the plaintiff’s cause of
action. 11 Justice Holmes so forcefully advocated for this understanding
of § 1331 that this view is often referred to as the “Holmes test.” 12
Conversely, pursuant to the second black-letter test, federal question
jurisdiction will lie in rare instances over state-law causes of action that
statutory amounts in controversy, the Act has been essentially unchanged since 1875. See, e.g., Pub.
L. No. 96-486, 94 Stat. 2369 (1980) (striking out the minimum amount in controversy requirement);
Pub. L. No. 85-554, 72 Stat. 415 (1958) (raising the minimum amount in controversy requirement to
$10,000). Finally, following most scholars, I exclude the short-lived general grant of federal
question jurisdiction passed at the end of President John Adams’s term and treat the 1875 Act as the
first general federal question grant.
5. See, e.g., Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 494 (1983).
6. Id. The Constitution prescribes the limits of subject matter jurisdiction for the federal courts.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. As a matter of constitutional law, the scope of federal question
jurisdiction—jurisdiction “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States”—is
quite broad. See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. 738, 822–23 (1824) (holding that any
federal “ingredient” is sufficient to satisfy the Constitution’s federal question jurisdiction
parameters). Despite this broad constitutional scope, the Constitution is not self-executing in this
regard. See Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 807 (1986).
7. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987) (“The ‘well-pleaded complaint
rule’ is the basic principle marking the boundaries of the federal question jurisdiction of the federal
district courts.”).
8. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) (establishing the
rule).
9. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986).
10. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 100 (1972) (“[Section] 1331 jurisdiction will support
claims founded upon federal common law as well as those of a statutory origin.”).
11. Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916) (Holmes, J.)
(applying this language: “arises under the law that creates the cause of action”).
12. The classic presentation of the Holmes test was made in 1916. See id. at 260 (“A suit arises
under the law that creates the cause of action.”).
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necessarily require construction of an embedded federal right. 13 As
Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co. 14 is the Court’s classic statement
of this position, this line of cases is often referred to as the Smith test. In
Smith, a stockholder-plaintiff brought a breach of fiduciary duty cause of
action under state law. This case would not satisfy the Holmes test, as it
was not brought under a federal cause of action. But the Court held that
federal question jurisdiction arose under § 1331 because an element of
the plaintiff’s state-law claim required adjudication of the
constitutionality of a federal act. 15 The standard account of § 1331
jurisdiction, then, finds that federal question subject matter jurisdiction
vests under one of two established tests: either (1) because the plaintiff
brings a federal cause of action under the Holmes test; or (2) the plaintiff
relies upon a federal right under the Smith test.
With this briefest of overviews in hand, I turn next to a summary of
Grossi’s thoughtful work that challenges many of these traditional
understandings of § 1331 jurisprudence. Grossi rejects both the cause-ofaction-based and rights-based views presented above and instead argues
that § 1331 jurisprudence should focus solely upon the Court’s 1936
Gully opinion. 16 In so doing, she casts off the Court’s current focus on
the Holmes test, with its focus on cause of action, which she describes as
overly “mechanical” 17 and contrary to the earlier—predominantly
nineteenth century—interpretations of the Act. 18 She similarly rejects a
view that focuses upon both rights and causes of action as a blend of the
Holmes and Smith tests, espoused by myself and others, 19 also as overly
mechanistic. 20 She contends that her view is superior to others as judged
by legal-process-school principles, which she asserts form the best
13. See Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 9
(1983) (finding the Holmes test as a rule of inclusion (citing T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d
823, 827 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J.))); see also Grable & Sons Metal Prod., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g &
Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312–13 (2005) (discussing the Smith test); Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 819–20
(same); Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 199 (1921) (“The general rule is that,
where it appears from the bill or statement of the plaintiff that the right to relief depends upon the
construction or application of the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that such federal
claim is not merely colorable, and rests upon a reasonable foundation, the District Court has
jurisdiction under this provision.”).
14. 255 U.S. 180 (1921).
15. Id. at 199–202.
16. See Grossi, supra note 2, at 985–86.
17. Id. at 987–1004.
18. Id. at 976–80.
19. See, e.g., Lumen N. Mulligan, A Unified Theory of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 Jurisdiction, 61 VAND.
L. REV. 1667 (2008) [hereinafter Mulligan, Unified Theory].
20. Grossi, supra note 2, at 981.
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vantage from which to evaluate the normative attractiveness of
jurisdictional doctrine. 21 Grossi presents these legal-process norms in
terms of five concepts: (1) a focus upon institutional settlement; (2) a
purposive approach to judicial decision-making; (3) a commitment to
rule of law; (4) a commitment to reasoned elaboration of enduring legal
principles; and (5) a special attention to the balancing of neutral
principles that transcend the immediate facts of any particular case such
as the structural features of the Constitution—namely, federalism,
separation of powers, and individual rights. 22
Relying on these principles, Grossi instructs us to consider Gully as
the proper cornerstone of § 1331 doctrine. The relevant facts from Gully
are straight-forward. Mr. Gully, a state tax collector, brought state law
causes of action against the First National Bank for overdue state
levies. 23 The case did not arise under the Holmes test precisely because
the plaintiff did not allege a federal cause of action. 24 Nevertheless, the
Bank removed to federal court on the theory that § 1331 jurisdiction
arose because a federal statute, which was otherwise not at issue in the
suit, initially allowed the state to levy taxes against this nationally
chartered bank. One interpretation, then, is that the Bank was pushing
for an extension of the Smith test. 25 The Supreme Court ultimately found
that jurisdiction did not lie in this matter.26
The following passage from Gully’s jurisdictional discussion forms
the crux of Grossi’s view of § 1331: 27
This Court has had occasion to point out how futile is the
attempt to define a “cause of action” without reference to the
context. To define broadly and in the abstract “a case arising
under the Constitution or laws of the United States” has hazards
of a kindred order. What is needed is something of that
common-sense accommodation of judgment to kaleidoscopic
situations which characterizes the law in its treatment of
problems of causation. One could carry the search for causes
backward, almost without end. Instead, there has been a
selective process which picks the substantial causes out of the
web and lays the other ones aside. As in problems of causation,
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Grossi, supra note 2, at 967–70.
Id.
Gully v. First Nat’l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 111 (1936).
See supra note 11 and accompanying text (outlining the Holmes test).
See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text (outlining the Smith test).
Gully, 299 U.S. at 114–15.
Grossi, supra note 2, at 1009.
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so here in the search for the underlying law. If we follow the
ascent far enough, countless claims of right can be discovered to
have their source or their operative limits in the provisions of a
federal statute or in the Constitution itself with its
circumambient restrictions upon legislative power. To set
bounds to the pursuit, the courts have formulated the distinction
between controversies that are basic and those that are collateral,
between disputes that are necessary and those that are merely
possible. We shall be lost in a maze if we put that compass by. 28
Grossi reads this passage as espousing a “claim-centered” view of
§ 1331 jurisdiction. As she puts it, “the law of federal question
jurisdiction . . . [should
be]
governed
by
a
claim-centered
[analysis], . . . that focuse[s] on the nature of the claim and the role that
federal law play[s] within that claim.” 29 Grossi defines claim “by
reference to the facts that establish a legal right to relief,” as that concept
is used in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and contemporary res
judicata law. 30 Given the Court’s kaleidoscope metaphor, it is easy to
conclude that this Gully approach lacks effective guidance. Grossi
disagrees. She argues that
Gully offers clear guidance as to the key question that should
inform the arising under jurisdiction analysis. That question asks
whether the “right or immunity [is] such that it will be supported
if the Constitution or laws of the United States are given one
construction or effect, and defeated if they receive another.” 31
Finally, she is of the view that this claim-centered approach comports
well with the five legal-process-school norms that she identifies as
hallmarks of sound jurisdictional jurisprudence. 32 As such, she
advocates a return to the Gully approach to § 1331 jurisprudence.
While I applaud Grossi’s call for a renewed fidelity to the legal
process school, I cannot agree that a Gully-inspired, or claim-centered,
construction of § 1331 is the best approach—even from a legal-processschool perspective. As the brief summary of her position suggests,
Grossi presents Gully in at least two lights. Often she reads Gully as a
call for judges simply to select sufficiently important matters, in relation
to plaintiff’s case in chief, for inclusion in federal question jurisdiction. 33
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Gully, 299 U.S. at 117–18 (citations omitted).
Grossi, supra note 2, at 986.
Id. at 982.
Id. at 986 (alteration in original) (quoting Gully, 299 U.S. at 112).
Id. at 1009–12.
Id. at 1009.
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At other times, or as compatible means of expressing the same concept,
Grossi reads Gully as building a § 1331 doctrine upon the concept of
claim, understood “by reference to the facts that establish a legal right to
relief” as that concept is used in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and contemporary res judicata law.34 I reject both readings of Gully as
setting the proper course for § 1331 jurisprudence.
In Part I, I consider whether a Gully-based approach to § 1331
doctrine, read as a call for judges simply to select sufficiently important
matters, in relation to plaintiff’s case in chief, for inclusion in federal
question jurisdiction, has a unique affinity with legal-process-school
jurisprudential foundations. I argue that it does not. I contend that a
rights and causes of action approach, as understood as a means of
effectuating the principle of congressional control over lower federal
court jurisdiction, is as—if not more—representative of the legal process
school as is a Gully approach.
In Part II, I address the myriad of difficulties that plague the reading
of Gully as espousing the concept of claim as the key component of
§ 1331 jurisprudence. First, I contend that Gully itself, as properly
interpreted, speaks in terms of rights, not claims. Second, I note that a
transactional, res judicata construction of claim, which Grossi advocates
for, is anachronistic as an interpretation of Gully. Third, I recount that
the Supreme Court’s contemporary usage of the term “claim” in a
§ 1331 setting necessarily includes the notions of right and cause of
action—the very analytic notions that a claim-centric view aims to
avoid. Fourth, other uses of claim in the § 1331 context, such as
Professor Paul Mishkin’s, 35 do not employ a res judicata construction of
the idea because § 1331 jurisprudence must speak to federal sources of
law, not simply fact patterns. And fifth, I illustrate that a claim-centered
approach to federal question jurisdiction tends to conflate jurisdictional
dismissals with on-the-merits dismissals.
In Part III, I postulate that the Gully view of § 1331 jurisdiction is
more emblematic of a pragmatic approach to jurisdictional law and
consider it (and ultimately disagree with it) as a contribution to the
broader contemporary discussion on the role of “simple” versus
“complex” jurisdictional regimes. Even while I disagree with the role
that claim should play in federal question jurisdiction, I welcome
Grossi’s reorientation of the federal-courts field back to its legalprocess-school roots and the opportunity that her important piece brings

34. Id. at 982.
35. See infra note 164.
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to reground all of our § 1331 discussions in that seminal philosophy.
I.

THE LEGAL PROCESS SCHOOL, GULLY, AND § 1331
DOCTRINE

I begin my discussion with the legal process school and attempts to
articulate refined statements of § 1331 decisional law. Often Grossi sets
Gully—read as a call for judges simply to select sufficiently important
matters, in relation to plaintiff’s case in chief, for inclusion in federal
question jurisdiction—as the only approach to § 1331 jurisprudence that
comports with the legal process school. In this Part, I contend that my
more reticulated “rights and causes of action” approach, understood as
representing the principle of congressional control over lower federal
court jurisdiction, better comports with the legal process school than
does a Gully-centered view.
Grossi’s labeling of her view as a “claim-centered” one is perhaps
unfortunate, as it may distract from what seems her broader concern of
countering “formalistic” and “mechanistic” § 1331 jurisdictional law. 36
What Grossi seems to intend by this specific charge is that § 1331
jurisprudence fails to steer toward true north, as espoused by proponents
of the legal process school, because it makes a fetish of vesting
jurisdiction in terms of the analytic jurisdictional units used by the
Holmes and Smith test (i.e., rights and causes of action) and thereby fails
to offer reasoned elaborations of the principles that undergird federal
question jurisdiction. 37 She sums up this position well in the following
passage that discusses the Gully opinion:
The only policy reflected in Justice Cardozo’s analysis is one of
careful judgment in determining whether the role played by the
federal question in the claim is sufficiently important to justify
the exercise of jurisdiction. Thus, the entire analysis focuses on
a durable principle, and no mechanical test or formula can
improve on that. Rather, as indicated by Justice Cardozo, a
mechanical approach carries the risk of creating doctrinal
labyrinths from which there is no exit. 38
Grossi here advocates for a reductionist principle approach to § 1331
jurisdiction that asks whether the federal issue in any given case is
sufficiently important, in relation to plaintiff’s case in chief, to justify
36. Grossi, supra note 2, at 981–82, 987–1004, 1009 (criticizing the Court and others as
producing a mechanistic approach to federal question jurisdiction).
37. Id. at 986, 1009.
38. Id. at 1009.
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taking federal jurisdiction. Such an approach, says Grossi, embraces key
legal-process-school norms by forswearing static, mechanistic decisionmaking, based upon empty and rigid formalisms, in lieu of a doctrine
founded upon an enduring principle of judicial selection of sufficiently
important matters.
I share Grossi’s view that the current Court’s rhetorical insistence
upon the Holmes-test formulation of § 1331 jurisdiction often falls short
of the mark on many grounds. As I have often argued, 39 the rhetoric of
the Holmes test frequently creates more confusion than clarity and that
both jurists 40 and commentators 41 desire greater coherence in § 1331
cases. While I also agree that the legal-process tradition from whence
these anti-formalist and anti-mechanistic impulses derive has much
merit, I disagree that Gully, interpreted as the judicial determination that
a matter is sufficiently important to justify federal jurisdiction,
inherently embraces that school of thought. Moreover, I disagree with
Grossi that employing rights and causes of action as the building blocks
for § 1331 jurisdiction necessarily runs contrary to the legal-processschool tradition.
To be sure, Grossi is correct that the Court has a proclivity toward
formalism in its federal-question jurisdiction doctrine. I follow Professor
Scott Idleman’s jurisdiction-specific definitions of formalism and
functionalism here. 42 By formalism, I mean judicial reasoning that is
39. See, e.g., Lumen N. Mulligan, You Can’t Go Holmes Again, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 237, 240–41
(2012) [hereinafter Mulligan, Can’t Go Holmes].
40. See, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 320–22
(2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) (lamenting the lack of clear-cut rules for § 1331 jurisdiction);
Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 818 (1988) (arguing that uncertain
jurisdictional rules have the regrettable effect of allowing “[p]arties [to] often spend years litigating
claims only to learn that their efforts and expense were wasted in a court that lacked jurisdiction”);
Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 821 n.1 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(stating a view, held by many, that § 1331 doctrine as it now stands is “infinitely malleable”).
41. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Under the Law of Federal Jurisdiction: Allocating Cases Between
Federal and State Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1211, 1225 (2004) (“One ought not make a fetish of
bright line rules, but they have their place, and one place in particular is the law of jurisdiction.”);
John F. Preis, Jurisdiction and Discretion in Hybrid Law Cases, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 145, 190–92
(2006) (calling for the adoption of a rule, as opposed to a standard, in Smith-style cases); Martin H.
Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business Between State and Federal Courts: Federal
Jurisdiction and “The Martian Chronicles,” 78 VA. L. REV. 1769, 1794 (1992) (arguing that
“jurisdictional uncertainty can surely lead to both a waste of judicial time and added expense to the
litigants”).
42. Scott C. Idleman, The Demise of Hypothetical Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 52 VAND.
L. REV. 235, 344–45 (1999). There is also a rich literature on discussing formalism more generally.
See, e.g., Larry Alexander, “With Me, It’s All er Nuthin”: Formalism in Law and Morality, 66 U.
CHI. L. REV. 530 (1999); Richard H. Pildes, Forms of Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 607 (1999);
Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988); Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On
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especially structural and categorical in its jurisdictional analysis.43 Such
an approach eschews balancing multiple interests on a case-by-case
basis in determining whether jurisdiction lies in favor of holding that all
suits bearing certain deductively determined attributes fall within the
courts’ jurisdictional scope. As a result, it is typically asserted that
formalist jurisdictional decisions lead to bright line rules. Functionalist
jurisdictional reasoning, by contrast, seeks to balance any number of
case-specific factors (e.g., docket control, fairness to litigants, federalism
concerns, congressional intent, as well as structural concerns) in
determining whether jurisdiction lies. 44 As such, functionalist
jurisdictional opinions tend to be more pragmatic and circumstantial in
focus, 45 thus leading many to conclude that such rulings fail to create
jurisdictional results that are cognizable ex ante. 46 Whether the federal
courts ought, across all contexts, to proceed in a formalist or
functionalist manner is a long-standing debate among jurists. 47 But this
general debate has found especial purchase in jurisdictional discussions
as the Court “indulges the old ‘habit’ of legal formalism” often in its
jurisdictional rulings. 48
It is beyond a doubt that the Court often allows mere formal
distinctions based upon a myopic focus on conceptual units such as
cause of action or right to vest federal question jurisdiction. For
example, federal common law often incorporates, as an overriding
presumption, state law rights as a rule of decision and the courts take
federal question jurisdiction due to the mere form of a federally created
cause of action. 49 Illustrating this point, in Kamen v. Kemper Financial

the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949 (1988).
43. Idleman, supra note 42, at 344.
44. Id. at 345.
45. Id.
46. Contrary to the traditional view, there may be value in this uncertainty. See Scott Dodson, The
Complexity of Jurisdictional Clarity, 97 VA. L. REV. 1 (2011) (arguing that jurisdictional certainty
is a goal that is both illusory and consistently overvalued normatively).
47. See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Printz, State Sovereignty, and the Limits of Formalism, 1997
SUP. CT. REV. 199, 201 (1997) (“Scholars and jurists have engaged in a long-standing debate
concerning the general propriety of formalist and functionalist approaches to constitutional
interpretation . . . .”).
48. Frederic M. Bloom, Jurisdiction’s Noble Lie, 61 STAN. L. REV. 971, 978 (2009); see also
Laura E. Little, Hiding with Words: Obfuscation, Avoidance, and Federal Jurisdiction Opinions, 46
UCLA L. REV. 75, 132 (1998) (commenting upon an empirical study of jurisdictional opinions
finding that the Court often falls into formalism); Stephen I. Vladeck, The Increasingly “Unflagging
Obligation”: Federal Jurisdiction After Saudi Basic and Anna Nicole, 42 TULSA L. REV. 553, 570
(2007) (describing the Court’s jurisdictional holdings as increasingly formalist).
49. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979) (holding that federal courts
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Services, Inc., 50 the Court took jurisdiction in a case where federal
common law was crafted to fill gaps in federal securities law, yet the
rule of decision in the case was supplied by state law absent preemption
by countervailing federal interests. 51 In such cases, the Court
improperly, in my view, relies on formalist reasoning in taking § 1331
jurisdiction.52 In fact, it is difficult to distinguish such “overriding
presumption state law incorporation federal common law cases” 53 from
situations where § 1331 jurisdiction is not found—such as Shoshone
Mining Co. v. Rutter 54 and protective jurisdiction 55—even though all
three of these lines of cases are functional equivalents. 56 Both require the
federal court to apply the law of the forum state unless overridden by an

should “incorporat[e] [state law] as the federal rule of decision” unless “application of [the
particular] state law [in question] would frustrate specific objectives of the federal programs”); see
also 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4518 n.17 (3d ed.
2008) [hereinafter WRIGHT ET AL.] (describing this presumption approach as the recent trend); id.
§ 4518 nn.31–32 (listing cases demonstrating federal interest needed to avoid cross-reference to
state law); id. § 4518 n.33–38 (exhaustively listing cases cross-referencing state law as a matter of
presumption).
50. 500 U.S. 90 (1991).
51. Id. at 98 (describing this as a presumption).
52. See Lumen N. Mulligan, Jurisdiction by Cross-Reference, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1177, 1226–
27, 1241–46 (2011) [hereinafter Mulligan, Cross-Reference] (discussing this set of cases and the
tendency toward formalism).
53. I do not mean to include all exercises of incorporating state law into federal common law as
the functional equivalent of protective jurisdiction. In prior work I more carefully parse out different
categories of federal common law that incorporate state law rules of decision. Mulligan, CrossReference, supra note 52, at 1221–23 (discussing incorporation of state law into federal common
law causes of action in a discretionary manner as not a acting as a functional protective jurisdiction).
54. 177 U.S. 505, 508 (1900).
55. See Carole E. Goldberg-Ambrose, The Protective Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 30
UCLA L. REV. 542, 549–50 (1983) (defining protective jurisdiction). There are two leading theories
of protective jurisdiction. First, we have Professor Mishkin’s, in which he contends that Congress
may vest jurisdiction over state-law claims if done as part of a broader federal program. Mishkin,
infra note 164, at 195–96. Second, we have Professor Wechsler, who contends that so long as
Congress could preempt state law by substantive legislation pursuant to Article I, it may deploy the
lesser power to vest federal jurisdiction over state-law claims. Herbert Wechsler, Federal
Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 216, 224–25
(1948). In this piece, I need not dip too deeply into the debates swirling around protective
jurisdiction. For those seeking more information, there is a wealth of literature. See, e.g., GoldbergAmbrose, supra; James E. Pfander, The Tidewater Problem: Article III and Constitutional Change,
79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1925, 1926 (2004); Gil Seinfeld, Article I, Article III, and the Limits of
Enumeration, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1389 (2010); Ernest A. Young, Stalking the Yeti: Protective
Jurisdiction, Foreign Affairs Removal, and Complete Preemption, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1775 (2007);
Scott A. Rosenberg, Note, The Theory of Protective Jurisdiction, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 933 (1982).
56. Mulligan, Cross-Reference, supra note 52, at 1226–27, 1241–46 (discussing this set of cases
and the tendency toward formalism).
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overwhelming federal interest. 57 Moreover, both are subject to similar
federalism58 and structural concerns. 59 Thus, from a functionalist view,
if protective Shoshone-style jurisdiction is beyond the boundaries of
federal question jurisdiction, then federal common law that deploys an
over-riding preference to adopt state law as the rule of decision should
be as well. 60 All this is to say that I concur that the Court is often guilty
57. Compare id. at 1226–27 (discussing that federal common law actions that carry a mandatory
selection of state law as the rule of decision are subject to federal interest preemption), with Kamen
v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 98 (1991) (holding that forum state law applies in federal
common law cases unless overridden by a strong showing of a unique federal interest).
58. Compare Mulligan, Cross-Reference, supra note 52, at 1191–96 (noting federalism concerns
in protective jurisdiction of stripping state courts of authority over state law), with Atherton v.
FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 218 (1997) (holding that because federal common law displaces state law,
such issues properly are matters of congressional concern), O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S.
79, 83 (1994) (rejecting federal common law rule for attorney malpractice, inter alia, as it would
“divest[] States of authority over the entire law of imputation”), Mark D. Rosen, Was Shelley v.
Kraemer Incorrectly Decided? Some New Answers, 95 CAL. L. REV. 451, 494–95 (2007)
(“[C]onstitutional preemption is a component of almost all the federal common law decisions that
displace state law with a judicially created alternative.”), and Jay Tidmarsh & Brian J. Murray, A
Theory of Federal Common Caw, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 585, 615 (2006) (“Federal common law
displaces state law, and thus shifts the balance of power from state to federal government.”).
59. Compare Mulligan, Cross-Reference, supra note 52, at 1191–96 (noting structural concerns
in protective jurisdiction of over-expanding federal court jurisdiction), with Carlos Manuel
Vázquez, W(h)ither Zschernig?, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1259, 1273 (2001) (“The Constitution’s
provisions setting forth the procedures for enacting legislation impose numerous obstacles to the
displacement of state law, chief among them the bicameralism and presentment requirements. These
requirements protect state prerogatives because the states are represented in the legislative process.
At the same time, they assure that the federal lawmaking branches will be accountable for any
federal decision to displace state law. When the courts decide to displace state law on the basis of
federal common law, the safeguards of the bicameralism and presentment requirements are
circumvented and no political actors can easily be held accountable for the displacement.”
(footnotes omitted)).
60. See, e.g., John T. Cross, Congressional Power to Extend Federal Jurisdiction to Disputes
Outside Article III: A Critical Analysis from the Perspective of Bankruptcy, 87 NW. U. L. REV.
1188, 1220 (1993) (“In short, the theory of protective jurisdiction is little more than federal common
law in disguise.”); Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Questions and the Human Rights Paradigm, 73
MINN. L. REV. 349, 381 (1988) (“Justice Frankfurter’s similar criticisms of both the federal
common-law and protective jurisdiction theories indicates that it is not always easy to separate the
two theories. Indeed, judicial reference to, or reliance on, nonfederal law in the creation of federal
common-law causes of action differs little from the adoption of nonfederal causes of action under
protective jurisdiction. Perhaps, then, the legitimacy of jurisdiction over federal common-law cases
also supports judicial authority under the protective jurisdiction theory.” (footnotes omitted)). To be
clear, I do not find this charge of formalism to carry the day in instances of federal common law in
which the courts engage in discretionary cross-references to state law. Nor do I find mandatory, or
metadiscretionary, cross-references to state law inapt when jurisdiction does not rest on the
existence of a federal question. See United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 591
(1973) (“The federal jurisdictional grant over suits brought by the United States is not in itself a
mandate for applying federal law in all circumstances. This principle follows from Erie itself,
where, although the federal courts had jurisdiction over diversity cases, we held that the federal
courts did not possess the power to develop a concomitant body of general federal law.”).
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of less-than-thoughtful, formalistic jurisdictional reasoning.
A.

Rights and Causes of Action as Expressions of Legal-ProcessSchool Norms

Despite the Court’s sloppy track record in this regard, there is nothing
in the concepts of rights or causes of action that inherently leads to such
empty formalistic rulings. Relying in large part on the concepts of right
and cause of action, I have argued that the Court’s § 1331 doctrine may
be captured by three distinct standards that afford more precise
application than references to Gully’s kaleidoscopic common sense 61 or
the Holmes test. I propose three standards. Standard one applies, in my
view, when a party makes a colorable assertion of a federal statutory,
constitutional, or treaty right coupled with an assertion of a nonjudicially
created federal cause of action.62 Standard two applies when a plaintiff
makes a substantial 63 assertion of a federal statutory or constitutional
right coupled with a state-law cause of action, as long as the vesting of
jurisdiction in any particular instance comports with congressional
intent. 64 Standard three applies when a plaintiff makes a substantial
assertion of a pure federal common law right and a cause of action,
coupled with a showing that supports the application of the federal
common law right. 65
I argue that these reformulations of § 1331 doctrine are not mere
mechanistic manipulations of empty formalisms. Rather, this
construction of rights and causes of action presents a means of
unearthing an enduring separation-of-powers principle justifying these
three standards; namely, that of congressional control over the
jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. A discussion of § 1331
jurisprudence in terms of rights and causes of action, then, can focus
upon an enduring principle that fits well within the legal process school
of thought (i.e., the separation-of-powers principle of congressional
control over lower court jurisdiction) and be purposive and dynamic.
Indeed, my view comports with all five legal-process norms that Grossi

61. See Gully v. First Nat’l Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109, 117–18 (1936) (“To define broadly
and in the abstract ‘a case arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States’ has hazards of
a kindred order. What is needed is something of that common-sense accommodation of judgment to
kaleidoscope situations . . . .”).
62. Mulligan, Unified Theory, supra note 19, at 1725–26.
63. I define colorable and substantial in greater detail in my prior work. Id. at 1682–85.
64. Id. at 1726.
65. Id.
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identifies. 66
My rights-and-causes-of-action approach comports with the
institutional settlement ideal by recognizing the institutional advantage
of Congress in making these delicate, federalism-laden choices about
jurisdiction. 67 Absent some argument on the peripheries, 68 jurists and
scholars agree that the lower court jurisdiction granted by Article III of
the Constitution is not self-executing and that Congress retains near
plenary power to vest the lower federal courts with as much or as little of
that Article III power as it sees fit. 69 Given that federal question
jurisdiction “masks a welter of issues regarding the interrelation of
federal and state authority and the proper management of the federal
judicial system,” 70 it makes sense that Congress renders these
jurisdictional decisions because it is the preeminent actor in resolving
federalism questions, 71 at least in regard to the intersection of federalism
66. Grossi, supra note 2, at 967–70.
67. Id.
68. See Lumen N. Mulligan, Did the Madisonian Compromise Survive Detention at
Guantánamo?, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535 (2010) (arguing that Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723
(2008), represents the first case to hold Congress constitutionally bound to vest lower court
jurisdiction).
69. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress and Federal
Jurisdiction, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1990) (“[C]ommentators mark out their individual lines
defining the precise scope of Congress’s authority, but no one has challenged the central assumption
that Congress bears primary responsibility for defining federal court jurisdiction.”); Idleman, supra
note 42, at 241 (“For both constitutional and institutional reasons, the subject-matter jurisdiction of
the federal courts is jealously guarded by its Article III keepers.”); id. at 250–51 (“[T]he jurisdiction
of the lower federal courts does not flow directly from Article III; rather, the jurisdictional grants of
Article III must be first affirmed by statute. . . . Congress—let alone the separation of powers—
might be doubly offended by the unauthorized exercise of judicial power.” (footnotes omitted));
James Leonard, Ubi Remedium Ibi Jus, or, Where There’s a Remedy, There’s a Right: A Skeptic’s
Critique of Ex Parte Young, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 215, 277 (2004) (“[T]he jurisdiction of the lower
courts is a matter of legislative discretion and not of ‘need’ defined from Article III.”); see also
MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER
83 (2d ed., The Michie Company 1990) (1980) (stating that federal courts can hear cases only if the
Constitution has authorized courts to hear such cases and Congress has vested that power in federal
courts); Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress’ Authority to
Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 25 (1981) (“Courts and
commentators agree that Congress’ discretion in granting jurisdiction to the lower federal courts
implies that those courts take jurisdiction from Congress and not from article III.”). Congress retains
broad control of the jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts, and it may grant a narrower scope of
subject matter jurisdiction than is found in Article III. See also infra note 188 (discussing
congressional control over lower court jurisdiction).
70. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8 (1983); see also Merrell
Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 810 (1986) (“[D]eterminations about federal
jurisdiction require sensitive judgments about congressional intent, judicial power, and the federal
system.”).
71. The classic example of so-called process federalism is Herbert Wechsler, The Political
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and the control of the federal courts’ jurisdiction. 72 As a result, the
Supreme Court consistently holds that Congress is the better institution
to make these judgments than are the federal courts. 73 This institutional
advantage flows from the fact that the states are represented there, the
actors involved are politically accountable, and the process for passing
federal statutes offers several opportunities for the states to give input. 74
My approach also fits well into the broader legal framework of
federal law by acknowledging the deeply rooted separation-of-powers
principles upon which Congress’s institutional advantage is laid. 75 This
separation-of-powers principle unifies all three § 1331 standards under
Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National
Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 543 (1954). See also Jesse H. Choper, The Scope of National
Powers Vis-à-Vis the States: The Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552, 1557 (1977)
(arguing that the national political system protects states’ interests in Congress and that the federal
courts should focus on individual rights); Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard
of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1324 (2001) (arguing that separation-of-powers doctrine
protects states’ interest in Congress by rendering the passage of federal legislation difficult); Larry
D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L.
REV. 215, 219 (2000) (arguing that political parties adequately represent states’ interests in
Congress); Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 120 HARV. L. REV.
1468, 1476 (2007) (“[A]ssigning Congress primary control over interstate relations accords with
precedent, federalism values, functional concerns, and history.”); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel,
Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and
Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 2031 (2003) (“Congress can draw on its distinctive
capacity democratically to elicit and articulate the nation’s evolving constitutional aspirations when
it enforces the Fourteenth Amendment. Because of the institutionally specific ways that Congress
can negotiate conflict and build consensus, it can enact statutes that are comprehensive and
redistributive, and so vindicate constitutional values in ways that courts cannot.”). Of course,
process federalism has its critics. See, e.g., Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Puzzling
Persistence of Process-Based Federalism Theories, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1459, 1462 (2001) (arguing
that process federalism does not adequately protect states’ interests and thus the federal courts must
play an active role in regard); Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional
Competence, and Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1733, 1815–48 (2005)
(arguing that the federal courts have a primary role to play in questions of federalism doctrine).
72. See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 341–42 (1969) (arguing that the Constitution places the
power to “expand the jurisdiction of [the lower federal] courts . . . specifically . . . in the Congress,
not in the courts”); Mishkin, infra note 164, at 159 (“[I]t is desirable that Congress be competent to
bring to an initial national forum all cases in which the vindication of federal policy may be at
stake.”); Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article
III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 1007 (2000) (“Rather than naturalizing a set of problems as
intrinsically and always ‘federal,’ I urge an understanding of ‘the federal’ as (almost) whatever
Congress deems to be in need of national attention, be it kidnapping, alcohol consumption, bank
robbery, fraud, or nondiscrimination.” (footnote omitted)).
73. See, e.g., Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966) (holding that “[w]hether
latent federal power should be exercised to displace state law is primarily a decision for Congress,”
not the federal courts).
74. See Vázquez, supra note 58, at 1273.
75. See Grossi, supra note 2, at 967–70.
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the banner of congressional intent. I think federal question jurisdiction is
better understood as the interplay of the viability of the federal right that
the plaintiff asserts with other messaging of congressional intent that the
plaintiff’s particular claim should be heard in the federal courts. 76 Under
my view, then, Congress controls federal question jurisdiction not only
by creating jurisdictional statutes such as § 1331, but also, as the Court
recently held in Mims v. Arrow Financial Services, 77 by creating rights
and causes of action. 78 Each component, both the right and the cause of
action, lends strength to a party’s assertion that congressional intent
supports taking jurisdiction in a given case. Thus, congressional creation
of rights, in most cases, 79 constitutes strong evidence of legislative intent
to vest the federal courts with § 1331 jurisdiction over suits seeking to
vindicate such rights. This determination of legislative intent to vest
follows from the creation of rights because Congress both intends that its
clearly stated, mandatory obligations will be enforced, and it legislates
against a historical backdrop in which the federal courts have been
essential to the enforcement of such federal rights. 80 In fact, the notion
76. Mulligan, Unified Theory, supra note 19, at 1726.
77. __U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 740 (2012).
78. Id. at 748–49 (“when federal law creates a private right of action and furnishes the substantive
rules of decision, the claim arises under federal law, and district courts possess federal-question
jurisdiction under § 1331.”); cf. Wasserman, infra note 181, at 676 (presenting a similar two-step
approach to jurisdictional questions, arguing that “[j]urisdictional grants empower courts to hear and
resolve cases brought before them by parties; substantive causes of action grant parties permission
to bring those cases before the court”); see also Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and
Non-Extant Rights, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 227, 257 (2008) (“The reach and scope of federal judicial
activity and influence can be constrained by jurisdiction stripping or by the non-existence as law of
rights and duties. Either apparently produces the same effect—fewer successful actions will be
brought in federal court to vindicate individual federal rights, arguably depriving courts of the
opportunity to perform their central and essential constitutional function.”).
As Professor Wasserman explains, the decision to “strip” a jurisdictional statute or limit rights
has numerous practical differences. Wasserman, supra note 78, at 257–74. However, for the
narrower purposes of this Article, which focus just on the vesting of § 1331 jurisdiction, these issues
are not as pressing.
79. Congress can create rights without vesting the federal courts with jurisdiction. However, such
acts are exceptional. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d) (2000) (limiting most Magnuson-Moss Warranty
Act claims to state court). Indeed, the Court now presumes the contrary outcome absent a clear
statement to the contrary. See Mims, 132 S. Ct. at 749 (“‘[D]ivestment of district court jurisdiction’
should be found no more readily than ‘divestmen[t] of state court jurisdiction,’ given the
‘longstanding and explicit grant of federal question jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1331.’” (internal
citations omitted)).
80. See, e.g., Federal Farmer XV (Jan. 18, 1788), reprinted in THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST
315 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (“It is true, the laws are made by the legislature; but the judges
and juries, in their interpretations, and in directing the execution of them, have a very extensive
influence for preserving or destroying liberty, and for changing the nature of the government.”);
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise
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that the creation of statutory rights expresses a legislative intent to vest
§ 1331 jurisdiction is so strong that many scholars have noted that the
creation of a federal right concomitantly creates § 1331 jurisdiction 81—a
concept to which the Court recently concurred. 82 An allegation of a
congressionally created cause of action is also strong evidence that
Congress desires that cases of that type be heard in federal court. This
determination of legislative intent follows from the creation of a cause of
action because this amounts to a finding that Congress has determined
the plaintiff is “an appropriate party to invoke the power of the [federal]
courts” in the matter at hand. 83 Thus, deploying right and cause of action
to evaluate whether § 1331 should vest need not be viewed as an empty
exercise in manipulating formalities, but as a constitutionally significant
quest for congressional intent.
My view is not static, nor do I focus upon analytic units such as right
or cause of action as ends in themselves. Accordingly, this view avoids a
in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1397 (1953) (“Remember the Federalist papers. Were the
framers wholly mistaken in thinking that, as a matter of the hard facts of power, a government needs
courts to vindicate its decisions?”); id. at 1372–73 (discussing the role of enforcement courts and
the constitutional constraints that come into play when Congress confers jurisdiction to enforce
federal law); John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673,
712 n.163 (1997) (“[A]ny effort to pare back federal jurisdiction would deny Congress an important
and historically effective forum for the implementation of its laws.”); Ernest A. Young,
Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L.
REV. 1549, 1611 (2000) (“Congress generally cannot ensure enforcement of its legislative mandates
without providing a federal judicial forum where violators of those mandates can be prosecuted.”).
Of course this raises the issue of the so-called “parity” debate between the federal and state courts.
The crux of this debate has been to determine which system, state or federal, better protects federal
rights. I need not dip into this debate, as it is likely incapable of non-normative resolution. See Brett
C. Gerry, Parity Revisited: An Empirical Comparison of State and Lower Federal Court
Interpretations of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 233, 237
(1999) (noting that the question “whether state courts are doing a good job of interpreting the
Federal Constitution . . . inevitably lead[s] to a conclusion influenced by the normative
preconceptions of the person who poses the query”). I need only assert that it makes sense to
interpret Congress as generally preferring a federal forum for the protection of federal rights.
Congress’s preference may have no factual foundation, but the lack of a foundation for Congress’s
intent is neither here nor there when one is focusing upon congressional intent as it is the
constitutionally empowered actor here. See supra note 71 (discussing process federalism in relation
to jurisdiction).
81. See Wasserman, infra note 181, at 677–78 (“The significance of statutory general federal
question jurisdiction is that when Congress enacts a substantive law, federal district courts
immediately and necessarily attain jurisdiction to hear claims under that statute, without Congress
having to do anything more.”). Of course, this only follows when one discusses statutory, not
constitutional, federal question jurisdiction. If there were not a well-established series of lower
federal courts, such a presumption may well be unsound.
82. See Mims, 132 S. Ct. at 748–49.
83. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 (1979); see also infra notes 158–60 and accompanying
text (defining the concept of cause of action).
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charge of being an exercise in empty formalism. 84 If Congress has not
created a right, then § 1331 jurisdiction will not vest, absent the
existence of federal constitutional or common law. Thus, if Congress
wishes to forestall the federal courts from taking a stand on an issue, it is
not required to actively reign in the judicial branch by positive
legislation or jurisdiction stripping; it need only refrain from passing
federal legislation in that arena. The default position, then, is that § 1331
jurisdiction does not lie,85 which helps to preserve exclusive state-court
jurisdiction over such questions. This principle of the preservation of
exclusive state-court jurisdiction, in turn, fosters federalism values. 86
Further, looking for congressional intent by way of rights and causes of
action avoids the critique that a congressional intent model of § 1331 is
static and thus incapable of accounting for the changing roles of the
federal and state courts since 1875. 87 That is, this reconceptualization
allows Congress to retain dynamic control over which cases vest in the
federal courts without wholesale reformation of the text of § 1331 itself
through the creation of rights and causes of action. From this vantage
point of congressional intent, it makes sense that the Court should be
more receptive to § 1331 jurisdiction over cases where Congress has
crafted both a federal right and cause of action than in suits which lack
such strong expressions of intent. 88 By this same fashion, my approach
explicitly links jurisdiction to congressional creation of rights, furthering
legal process rule of law norms. 89
Finally, this approach offers a judicially meaningful explanation,
which (even if not convincing for those who would construct the
doctrine differently) meets the obligation to provide reasoned
84. Grossi, supra note 2, at 968 (noting that the legal process school takes an anti-formalist
stance).
85. See, e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (holding
§ 1331 jurisdiction is presumed not to exist in a suit to enforce a settlement agreement).
86. See, e.g., James A. Gardner, State Constitutional Rights as Resistance to National Power:
Toward a Functional Theory of State Constitutions, 91 GEO. L.J 1003, 1005 (2003) (discussing the
value of judicial federalism and the role of state courts in resisting national tyranny); James A.
Gardner, State Courts as Agents of Federalism: Power and Interpretation in State Constitutional
Law, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1725, 1746–60 (2003) (same).
87. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 69, at 3 (discussing the need for an approach to federal
jurisdiction that is “flexible enough to take into account changing conceptions of the roles” of
various courts).
88. Mulligan, Unified Theory, supra note 19, at 1732–41 (discussing differing degrees of indicia
of congressional intent to vest jurisdiction in statutory, constitutional, treaty, and federal common
law cases and how these evidences of intent coincide with increasingly difficult standards to vest
§ 1331 jurisdiction).
89. Grossi, supra note 2, at 967–70.
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elaboration for judicial decisions. Thus, my rights-and-causes-of-actionbased view, with its congressional intent focus, is not an exercise in
judicial policy making. 90 Rather, it is a reasoned effort to effectuate the
fundamental norm of congressional control over lower court jurisdiction
in the face of ever-evolving fact patterns, legal landscapes and imperfect
information.
B.

The Gully Approach to § 1331 Fails to Live Up to the Standards of
the Legal Process School

While my rights-and-causes-of-action approach, with its focus on
congressional intent, fits well within the legal process school, taking
federal question jurisdiction by focusing upon a judicial determination
that a federal issue is sufficiently important, in relation to plaintiff’s case
in chief, 91 as Gully at times suggests, can claim no unique assertion to
serve as an enduring jurisdictional principle under the legal process
school of thought. Indeed, this view, which places ultimate decisional
focus on the judge’s policy determination that a matter is sufficiently
important to merit federal jurisdiction, runs afoul of several key legal
process norms all at once. By focusing on judicial determinations of
importance of the federal issue, it fails to recognize the institutional
advantage Congress holds in making jurisdictional rules and thereby
runs afoul of key separation of powers principles that undergird the legal
process school. Furthermore, the legal process school posits that rule of
law principles are founded on the notion that jurisdictional rules are in
reality rules regulating substantive rights. 92 As such, it is puzzling that
this Gully approach explicitly rejects deploying rights as a key element
in the § 1331 analysis. 93 This point is all the more troubling, from a
legal-process-school perspective, given that Professors Henry Hart and
Albert Sacks, founders of the school, relied heavily on the distinction
between rights and causes of action as foundational in their work 94 (or as
they termed them, primary and secondary rights). 95
90. Compare with id. at 969.
91. Id. at 1009.
92. Id. at 969.
93. Id. at 982–83.
94. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS at 130 (William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994); see also id. (“The duty . . . is the central conception of
regulatory law . . . .”); cf. id. at 127–28 n.4 (reproducing Professor Hohfeld’s tables of jural
opposites and jural correlatives).
95. See Mulligan, Can’t Go Holmes, supra note 39, at 244–45 (noting that the terminology of
“primary right” maps on to what in this piece I label “right” and secondary rights maps onto what in
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Finally, even if anti-formalist, this Gully-centered view offers little by
way of reasoned elaboration of § 1331 doctrine. The approach leaves the
whole of § 1331 jurisdiction to the judicial gut-check of is “the claim . . .
sufficiently important to justify the exercise of jurisdiction”96 and relies
upon kaleidoscope metaphors. 97 Such an approach is little more than an
invitation for individual judges to deploy their own preferences
regarding “importance” in determining when § 1331 vests. The Gully
approach hardly makes a credible assertion that it embodies a “reasoned
elaboration of principles and policies that are ultimately traceable to
more democratically legitimate decisionmakers.” 98 To the contrary, my
congressional-intent approach explicitly traces jurisdictional decisions
back to congressional choice as expressed by the creation of rights and
causes of action.
At times, Grossi seems to assume that any finer-grained analysis that
might cabin such unmitigated policy preferences in this area would
improperly transform an enduring principle for taking § 1331
jurisdiction into a meaningless doctrinal maze. 99 The legal process
school, however, does not eschew the crafting of detailed and precise
doctrine. As Professor Richard Fallon explains, the legal process
“paradigm also captures ideals of judicial decisionmaking . . . .
[wherein] judges and lawyers seek uniting and controlling principles and
develop distinctions, as they must, to explain why some cases and fact
situations are governed by one principle, some by another.” 100 That is to
say, one of the lodestars for legal-process-school scholars is that
“analyzing legal doctrines . . . [can] generate fresh insights by exposing
previously unrecognized patterns,
connections,
assumptions,
101
implications, tensions, symmetries, or asymmetries.” That is, it is the
job of the legal-process-school scholar to find, if they are there, refined

this piece I label as “cause of action”); infra note 153 and accompanying text (defining rights in
Hohfeldian terms).
96. Grossi, supra note 2, at 982–83.
97. See Gully v. First Nat’l Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109, 117 (1936) (“To define broadly and
in the abstract ‘a case arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States’ has hazards of a
kindred order. What is needed is something of that common-sense accommodation of judgment to
kaleidoscope situations . . . .”).
98. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 VAND. L. REV.
953, 966 (1994).
99. Grossi, supra note 2, at 1009.
100. Richard Fallon, Comparing Federal Courts “Paradigms,” 12 CONST. COMMENT. 3, 10
(1995).
101. Richard Fallon, Why and How to Teach Federal Courts Today, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 693,
706 (2009).
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patterns and connections in what may at first blush appear to be
unrefined decisional law. Summing up § 1331 jurisprudence as the quest
for “sufficiently important” federal questions and refusing more refined
analysis of the doctrine as too mechanistic or formalistic, as Grossi at
times characterizes as the Gully view, seems more a rejection of the
legal process school than an embrace. Or as Fallon puts it, “the Hart &
Wechsler paradigm by no means precludes all distinctions—only
unprincipled ones.” 102
At other times, perhaps predicting these difficulties, Grossi seeks
greater precision from Gully. In so doing she looks to the following
language from the opinion:
To bring a case within the statute [i.e., § 1331], a right or
immunity created by the Constitution or laws of the United
States must be an element, and an essential one, of the plaintiff’s
cause of action. The right or immunity must be such that it will
be supported if the Constitution or laws of the United States are
given one construction or effect, and defeated if they receive
another. A genuine and present controversy, not merely a
possible or conjectural one, must exist with reference
thereto . . . . 103
Here, Grossi argues that
Gully offers clear guidance as to the key question that should
inform the arising-under jurisdiction analysis. That question asks
whether the “right or immunity [is] such that it will be supported
if the Constitution or laws of the United States are given one
construction or effect, and defeated if they receive another.” 104
This construction of Gully, however, seems more akin to my rightscentric view than not. Note this presentation of her view—the one that
may escape the legal-process-school charges of undue vagueness and
violation of separation-of-powers principles—explicitly incorporates the
concept of rights as the factor that offers clear guidance for courts. But if
this inclusion of rights is essential to the presentation of a coherent legalprocess-school-inspired view of § 1331 jurisdiction, then this Gullybased project fails on its own terms. Grossi insists that her approach is
not reliant upon, and must not be reliant upon, the notions of rights or
causes of action. 105 She may not look, then, to rights as a concept in an

102.
103.
104.
105.

Fallon, supra note 100, at 15.
Gully v. First Nat’l Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109, 112–13 (1936).
See Grossi, supra note 2, at 986 (quoting Gully, 299 U.S. at 112).
Id. at 981–82.
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attempt to salvage otherwise unworkable platitudes from Gully into a
functioning § 1331 jurisprudence. As I discuss below in more detail, to
the degree that Grossi concludes that Gully really espouses a rightscentric view of federal question jurisdiction, I agree. But this
interpretation of Gully is antithetical to her stated project of divorcing
§ 1331 jurisdiction from the “mechanistic” concepts of rights and causes
of action.
II.

READING GULLY AS A CLAIM-BASED APPROACH

While she often advocates for a view of § 1331 doctrine that looks
only for judicially determined important federal questions, in relation to
plaintiff’s case in chief, at other points Grossi argues more specifically
for a “claim-centric” interpretation of § 1331 doctrine. Turning now to
this latter construction of her view, I part with Grossi on two broad
grounds. First, I assert that this claim-centered approach is at once both
an inaccurate and anachronistic interpretation of Gully. Second, putting
these historical points aside, I note that the Supreme Court’s
contemporary use of the term “claim” subsumes the very notions of right
and cause of action that the claim-centric view aims to avoid, and that a
claim-centered view is likely to cause more practical havoc than help.
A.

There Is No Golden-Age of a Claim-Centric § 1331 to Which We
Can Return

I turn first to the issues surrounding the attribution of the claimcentered view to Gully. Here I make two points. First, I argue that Gully
actually represents a rights-focused, not claim-focused, construction of
§ 1331. Second, I contend that the term “claim,” as Grossi defines it, is
anachronistic in relation to the Gully opinion.
1.

Gully Speaks in Terms of Rights, Not Claims

To begin, the Gully opinion speaks predominately in terms of
“rights,” not “claims” as Grossi asserts. Gully uses the term “claim” in a
jurisdictional discussion only once. 106 The term “right,” however, is
employed nine times. Moreover, in this one jurisdictional use of the term
claim, it is used in the context of a discussion of rights: “If we follow the
ascent far enough, countless claims of right can be discovered to have
their source or their operative limits in the provisions of a federal statute

106. Gully v. First Nat. Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 118 (1936).
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or in the Constitution itself with its circumambient restrictions upon
legislative power.” 107 As the Gully Court itself makes clear, it takes a
rights-focused approach to § 1331 doctrine.
Indeed, the following rights-centered quotation best sums up the
Gully view:
We recur to the test announced in Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co.,
supra: “The federal nature of the right to be established is
decisive—not the source of the authority to establish it.” Here
the right to be established is one created by the state. If that is
so, it is unimportant that federal consent is the source of state
authority. To reach the underlying law we do not travel back so
far. 108
I have discussed the Russell opinion’s importance to a rights-centered
model of § 1331 jurisprudence often, 109 contending that it is a
foundational case for a rights-centered approach to § 1331 jurisdiction.
As such, I am of the view that Gully’s reliance on it cannot be easily
dismissed or re-explained in claim-centered terms.
In Russell, 110 the Court clearly held that, despite the Holmes test, the
focus for § 1331 jurisdiction is the assertion of a federal right, not a
federal cause of action. 111 In this case, Puerto Rico sought to collect a tax
debt in court because a federal statute required the collection of such
claims by a suit at law, as opposed to an attachment proceeding, and it
created a federal cause of action to do so. 112 Puerto Rico began a suit at
law in the Puerto Rican courts to collect the tax.113 The defendant
removed to federal district court, relying upon the Holmes test,
contending that the case arose under § 1331. 114 The similarity of the
jurisdictional posture of Russell to Gully reinforces the importance of
Russell’s holding in properly interpreting Gully. Declining federal
question jurisdiction in Russell, the Court held that § 1331 may only be
“invoked to vindicate a right or privilege claimed under a federal statute.

107. Id. (emphasis added).
108. Id. at 116.
109. See Mulligan, Can’t Go Holmes, supra note 39, at 258; Mulligan, Cross-Reference, supra
note 52, at 1197 & n.108; Lumen N. Mulligan, Federal Courts Not Federal Tribunals, 104 NW. U.
L. REV. 175, 196–97 (2010) [hereinafter Mulligan, Tribunals]; Mulligan, Unified Theory, supra
note 19, at 1690–91, 1706–07.
110. 288 U.S. 476 (1933).
111. Id. at 483–84.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 477.
114. Id. at 477–78.
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It may not be invoked where the right asserted is non-federal, merely
because the plaintiff’s right to sue is derived from federal law.” 115 The
Court further reasoned that “[t]he federal nature of the right to be
established is decisive [for jurisdictional purposes]—not the source of
the authority to establish it.” 116 Gully, as the Court clearly states, is but
an application of this rights-centered model of § 1331 jurisdiction.
The Court has relied upon this same anti-Holmes, rights-centered
theory of § 1331 jurisdiction as espoused in Russell in at least three other
cases. In Jackson Transit Authority v. Local Division 1285,
Amalgamated Transit Union, 117 the Court considered whether claims
brought under the Urban Mass Transportation Act, which creates a
federal cause of action to enforce collective-bargaining agreements,
arose under § 1331. The Court held they do not because the statute
mandated that the rule of decision in these suits must be determined by
state contract law. 118 Similarly, in Gully, the Court refused statutory
federal question jurisdiction over a suit to collect state taxes from a
nationally charted bank, despite the existence of a federal statute
allowing the levy of such a tax, reasoning that “the federal nature of the
right to be established is decisive—not the source of the authority to
establish it.” 119 And earlier, in Shulthis v. McDougal, 120 the Court held
that a congressionally created equitable quiet title cause of action lacked
statutory federal question jurisdiction because state law controlled the
land rights in question. 121 The courts of appeals have also relied upon
this rights-focused § 1331 analysis. 122
As such, even if a claim-centered approach to § 1331 jurisdiction is
115. Id. at 483.
116. Id.
117. 457 U.S. 15 (1982).
118. Id. at 29.
119. Gully v. First Nat’l Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109, 114 (1936) (quoting Russell, 288 U.S.
at 483).
120. 225 U.S. 561 (1912).
121. Id. at 569–70.
122. See, e.g., Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Kain, 485 F.3d 730, 734–35 (2d Cir. 2007)
(holding that the federal courts lacked § 1331 jurisdiction because the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act empowered plaintiff to sue but the rights at issue were entirely a matter of state law);
City Nat’l Bank v. Edmisten, 681 F.2d 942, 945–46 (4th Cir. 1982) (holding that the National Bank
Act “is not a sufficient basis for federal question jurisdiction simply because it incorporates state
law” when the act makes usury, as defined by local state law, illegal, and the nondiverse parties
were only contesting the meaning of North Carolina’s usury law); Standage Ventures, Inc. v.
Arizona, 499 F.2d 248, 250 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding no federal question arises where “the real
substance of the controversy . . . turns entirely upon disputed questions of law and fact relating to
compliance with state law, and not at all upon the meaning or effect of the federal statute itself”).
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normatively attractive, which is a point I will return to below,123 the text
of the Gully opinion cannot be reinterpreted as supporting such a
position. Indeed, Grossi inexplicably takes the opinion’s rights-centered
language and simply insists that it means “claim.” For example, she
quotes the following from Gully: “The right or immunity [is] such that it
will be supported if the Constitution or laws of the United States are
given one construction or effect, and defeated if they receive another.” 124
She interprets this language in the following manner: “In other words,
the goal is to determine whether resolution of the plaintiff’s claim turns
on a question of federal law.” 125 Unless right and claim are synonyms—
which Grossi insists they are not 126—interpretations of Gully such as this
are not supportable by the text. Indeed, the very cases Grossi provides as
illustrative of the prevalence of Gully and the claim-centric view all
quote or rely upon the rights-centered language presented above. 127 The
notion, then, that Gully itself stands for a jurisdictional analysis that is
independent of the rights-centered approach found in cases such as
Russell, which Gully quotes and relies extensively upon, asks more of
the opinion than it can possibly offer; 128 as does the related claim that in
the mid-twentieth century Gully was the leading § 1331 case. 129

123. See infra Part II.B.
124. Gully, 299 U.S. at 112 (emphasis added); Grossi, supra note 2, at 986.
125. Grossi, supra note 2, at 986 (emphasis added).
126. Id. at 981–82.
127. Id. at 987 n.148 (citing Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 415 U.S. 125, 128 (1974);
Oneida Indian Nation v. Cnty. of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 675 (1974); Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips
Petrol. Co., 339 U.S. 667, 672 (1950)).
128. See supra note 109 (listing past discussions of Russell).
129. Grossi, supra note 2, at 987 (“[T]he Supreme Court’s approach to federal question
jurisdiction began to diverge from Gully’s path in 1983 with the decision in Franchise Tax Board v.
Construction Laborers Vacation Trust.”). This truly startling assertion, which Grossi supports with
three case citations, cannot bear the weight of the evidence. See, e.g., Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v.
Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 409 (1981); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 100–01 (1972); Int’l
Ass’n of Machinists, AFL-CIO v. Cent. Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 682, 696–97 (1963); Romero v.
Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 393 (1959) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part and
concurring in part); Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 291 U.S. 205, 217 (1934); Missouri ex
rel. St. Louis, B. & M. Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 266 U.S. 200, 207–08 (1924); Lambert Run Coal Co. v.
Balt. & Ohio R.R., 258 U.S. 377, 382 (1922); see also 13D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 49, § 3562,
at 183 (noting that the Holmes test is the “starting point,” even if not the whole story, for § 1331
analysis). The first edition of Wright, Miller and Cooper, however, does support Grossi’s claim. See
13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3562, at 405 (1st ed.
1975) (“The case now most relied on in determining whether federal question jurisdiction exists is
Gully.”). This assertion, however, appears to be a factual error. A Westlaw search for “Holmes test”
references prior to Franchise Tax Board in the “All Cases” database, returns 258 case citations, not
to mention nearly 300 secondary authority citations. A similar date-bounded search for citations to
Gully prior to the Franchise Tax Board decision returns 181 case citations. Further, the early
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“Claim” in the Context of Gully Is Anachronistic

This discussion so far begs the question, if a claim is not a right nor a
cause of action, just what does Grossi mean by claim? Grossi states,
“Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (and under the modern law
of res judicata or preclusion), a claim is defined by reference to the facts
that establish a legal right to relief.” 130 That is to say, she defines a
§ 1331 claim in fact-based terms as the notion of claim is used by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and contemporary preclusion doctrine.
Before considering the normative merits of this position, it is
important to note that the Gully opinion itself, to the very limited extent
it might be re-imagined as employing the concept of claim, surely did
not do so using this contemporary, transactional-based, Federal Rules
definition of claim. The Gully opinion was handed down in November of
1936. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, were first enacted
in December 1938. 131 Moreover, American courts did not take a
transactional approach to res judicata in the 1930s. Rather, the thenleading approach was the “single right” view. 132 The leading federal res
judicata case at the time of Gully was the 1927 Baltimore Steamship Co.
v. Phillips 133 opinion, which espoused the single-right approach
wholeheartedly. 134 Moreover, the earliest academic urgings for a
transactional approach to claim preclusion came in the 1940s, 135 with
broader court acceptance only occurring much later. 136 Regardless, then,
of whether Grossi’s view of claim is normatively attractive, it would be
an anachronistic error to attribute this view to the Gully opinion.

Wright, Miller and Cooper was not an unabashed proponent of Gully. See 13 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3562, at 405 (1st ed. 1975) (“Unfortunately
although there is much that is valuable in Gully, there is also much that is questionable or
misleading.”).
130. Grossi, supra note 2, at 982.
131. See Lumen N. Mulligan & Glen Staszewski, The Supreme Court’s Regulation of Civil
Procedure: Lessons from Administrative Law, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1188, 1198–99 (2012) (discussing
the original procedures for enacting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
132. See 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 49, § 4407 n.30 and accompanying text.
133. 274 U.S. 316 (1927).
134. Id. at 321.
135. See CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 477 (West Publ. 2d
ed. 1947) (suggesting measuring a cause of action as “a group of operative facts giving rise to one
or more rights of action”); William W. Blume, The Scope of A Civil Action, 42 MICH. L. REV. 257,
282–83 (1943) (arguing for a rule requiring joinder of “all claims which arise from the same
transaction or occurrence, or which involve common questions of law or fact”). Of course, Clark
was a key author of the Federal Rules, and his thoughts on this matter influenced their wording.
136. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1981).
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Similarly, at times Grossi suggests that her view of claim recaptures
nineteenth century interpretations of federal question jurisdiction.137
These older views were broader than contemporary § 1331 opinions, as
they tended to import the full scope of Article III jurisdiction into the
federal question statute.138 Even under this understanding, Grossi’s
transactional approach to claim remains an anachronism. Near the time
of the ratification of the Constitution, the Supreme Court held Article III
federal question jurisdiction “to mean that a federal court may exercise
jurisdiction over cases in which an actual federal law was determinative
of a right or title asserted in the proceeding before it.” 139 Professor Bellia
offers the leading pieces discussing the original-meaning interpretations
of Article III federal question jurisdiction. 140 Bellia contends that, from
an originalist perspective, Article III arising under jurisdiction is best
comprehended in the context of writ pleading prevalent at the time of the
founding. 141 In fact, the federal courts did not address Article III’s
federal question jurisdiction provisions entirely anew. Indeed, English
law used the term “arising” on occasion, typically meaning that the
action must rely upon the source of law from which it arises or the action
must arise from a bounded physical territory. 142 Relying on this past
practice, the federal courts constructed the meaning of Article III federal

137. See, e.g., Grossi, supra note 2, at 976–80.
138. Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, Federal Question Jurisdiction and Justice Holmes,
84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2151, 2160–68 (2009).
139. Anthony J. Bellia Jr., The Origins of Article III “Arising Under” Jurisdiction, 57 DUKE L.J.
263, 269 (2007).
140. Bellia, supra note 139 (arguing that Article III is best interpreted in light of writ pleading
concepts and that this insight produces important ramifications for understanding Article III federal
question jurisdiction under Osborn, standing doctrine, and inferred cause of action doctrine). But
note that professors Stewart and Sunstein reject the view that
[t]hese objections to judicial creation of private remedies can be summarized in what we term
the formalist thesis. That thesis holds that legal rights cannot be derived from conceptions of
natural justice, background understandings, or theories of sound government. Unless the right
to be vindicated is granted by the Constitution or a statute, courts lack authority to recognize it;
the only basis of legal rights is a textual instrument drawn by a sovereign lawmaking authority.
Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV.
1195, 1221 (1982).
141. Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Article III and the Cause of Action, 89 IOWA L. REV. 777, 780–81
(2004).
142. See, e.g., Hyde v. Cogan, [1781] 99 Eng. Rep. 445 (K.B.) 450 (Buller, J.) (describing a
claim based upon “the [statutory] clause upon which the case arises”); Millar v. Taylor, [1769] 98
Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B.) 212 (describing a remedy as “aris[ing] from” a statute); Beak v. Thyrwhit,
[1688] 87 Eng. Rep. 124 (K.B.) (holding that cases that “aris[e] upon the sea” must be tried in
admiralty); 1 MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW *562 (T. Cunningham ed., 6th
ed., Dublin, Luke White 1793) (“Inferior Courts are bounded, in their original Creation, to Causes
arising within such limited jurisdiction.”).
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question jurisdiction. 143 Thus, the Court, before issuing Osborn v. Bank
of the United States, 144 concluded that Article III arising under
jurisdiction requires that “federal law created or protected the right or
title” at issue. 145 A transactional concept of claim, then, is simply not
within that eighteenth century jurisdictional world view. 146
B.

Contemporary Usage of Jurisdictional Claim Does Not Support a
Claim-Centered View of § 1331 Doctrine

Of course, the claim-centered view need not be wedded to Gully, an
(in)famously sphinx-like opinion, in order to be persuasive. Rather, it
could be grounded in contemporary usage. Even under this reading, I
must respectfully disagree with the claim-centered approach’s viability
as an interpretation of § 1331. First, the Court’s contemporary use of the
term claim includes cause of action and right as component parts of the
concept, rendering any attempt to contrast claim as entirely distinct from
right and cause of action futile. Second, as others who deploy claim in a
jurisdictional context note, a § 1331 claim, if we are to use such terms,
must not be defined in a fact-focused manner because federal question
jurisdiction is inherently linked to the question of sources of law, not
fact patterns. Finally, I assert that a claim-centric view, even if removed
from an affiliation with Gully, is prone to cause more practical

143. See Bellia, supra note 139, at 272; see also Turner v. Bank of North America, 4 U.S. (4
Dall.) 8, 10–11 (1799) (construing diversity jurisdictional statute against the background of English
jurisdictional law); Shedden v. Custis, 21 F. Cas. 1218, 1219 (C.C.D. Va. 1793) (No. 12,736)
(opinion of Jay, Circuit Justice) (noting in a diversity case adopting English jurisdictional law that
“[t]he English practice has been rightly stated by the defendant’s counsel, and those rules are more
necessary to be observed here than there, on account of a difference of the general and state
governments”).
144. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
145. Bellia, supra note 140, at 328. Bellia predominantly relies upon two cases here. First,
Owings v. Norwood’s Lessee, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 344, 347–48 (1809), in which the Court finds a lack
of federal question jurisdiction to hear a property claim under the Treaty of Paris ending the
Revolutionary War because the treaty merely promises to recognize state-law property rights—if
the treaty had created the property rights, then the suit would arise under the treaty. Second, Cohens
v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 379 (1821), in which the Court, in relation to the question of
Article III federal question jurisdiction, held: “A case in law or equity consists of the right of the
one party, as well as of the other, and may truly be said to arise under the constitution or a law of
the United States, whenever its correct decision depends on the construction of either.” Id.
146. Bellia, supra note 141, at 838 (“At common law, courts did not create remedies whenever a
defendant deprived a plaintiff of a statutory benefit; they afforded common law remedies that
existed under state law or general principles for certain injuries that happened to arise from a
statutory violation. Again, to advocate a return to the common law approach, but to substitute a
benefit- or rights-based conception of the cause of action, is to claim a broader judicial power than
courts historically exercised.”).
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headaches and confusions than it will solve.
1.

The Court’s Current Use of Claim Subsumes Causes of Action and
Rights

Even if we move away from Gully and older usage of claim toward a
contemporary use of the term as the best understanding for what triggers
§ 1331 jurisdiction, the claim-centric view is fraught. Grossi contends
that a claim is a functionally different concept from cause of action 147
and from right. 148 She defines claim in fact-based terms referencing a
transactional approach to res judicata doctrine. 149 This definition,
however, is misapplied in relation to her project given that the Supreme
Court’s own definition of claim, as used in a federal question subject
matter jurisdictional setting, is one that subsumes the concepts of right
and cause of action as component parts of a claim.
In fairness to everyone who struggles with § 1331 doctrine, the
Supreme Court has not consistently deployed terminology in this arena,
which in turn fosters confusion. The Court is not always imprecise,
however. In Davis v. Passman, 150 for instance, it produced clear
definitions of right, cause of action, and claim in relation to § 1331
jurisdiction. 151 The Court continues to adhere to this basic framework
established in Passman, which does not run in line with a transactional,
res judicata conception of a jurisdictional claim.
A “right,” under this view, is an obligation owed by the defendant to
which the plaintiff is an intended beneficiary. 152 This notion of
obligation can be thought of in a Hohfeldian sense in that the obligation
imposes a correlative duty upon the defendant to either refrain from
interfering with, or to assist, the plaintiff.153 An obligation standing
alone, in the Court’s view, is not sufficient for status as a right. In

147. Grossi, supra note 2, at 982 (“I would rather focus the jurisdictional inquiry on what
constitutes a ‘claim.’”).
148. Id.
149. Id. (“[A] claim is defined by reference to the facts that establish a legal right to relief.”).
150. 442 U.S. 228, 238–39 (1979).
151. Id. at 239 & n.18, 243–44.
152. Id.
153. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917) (critiquing legal analysis for imprecise use of terminology, and
introducing the idea that rights are best understood as obligations coupled with correlative duties);
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913) (same).
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addition, an obligation must be mandatory. 154 And the language at issue
must not be “too vague and amorphous” or “beyond the competence of
the judiciary to enforce.” 155 This three-part test—mandatory obligation,
clear statement, and enforceability 156—remains the Court’s rubric for
determining when a right exists. 157
A plaintiff has a “cause of action” if he or she falls into a class of
litigants empowered to enforce a right in court. 158 As the Passman Court
put it, “a cause of action is a question of whether a particular plaintiff is
a member of the class of litigants that may, as a matter of law,
appropriately invoke the power of the court.” 159 The concept of cause of
action relates to the notion of a right insofar as plaintiffs must have
rights before they can be persons empowered to enforce them. But the
concept of cause of action is not identical with the notion of a right. That
is to say, one may have a right, yet lack the power to enforce the right.
For example, under certain statutory schemes one’s rights may only be
secured by an administrative agency. 160 All this is to say, Congress may
vest individuals with rights but withhold causes of action to enforce
those rights by way of private suit.
A “claim,” according to Passman, constitutes its own concept. As the
154. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 24 (1981) (finding that provisions
of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act “were intended to be hortatory,
not mandatory”).
155. Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 431–32 (1987).
156. This last prong is, or nearly is, identical to the concept of remedy. But whether a court can
issue an effective remedy is best understood as a matter of standing. See Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (discussing redressability). Including redressability in the
rights analysis is double counting at best. A more troubling result could be the collapse of the
distinction between rights and remedy as this final statement appears to incorporate redressability as
part of the rights analysis. Given that the Court has consistently striven since the 1970s to
distinguish between rights and remedies, see Donald H. Zeigler, Rights, Rights of Action, and
Remedies: An Integrated Approach, 76 WASH. L. REV. 67, 84–104 (2001), however, it would be a
disservice to read this collapse into this Article’s jurisdictional analysis unless it is absolutely
necessary. I will, therefore, focus on the notions of mandatory obligation and clear statement.
157. Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989); see also Blessing v.
Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340–41 (1997) (discussing the three-part test); Lividas v. Bradshaw, 512
U.S. 107, 132–33 (1994) (same); Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 363 (1992) (same); Wilder v. Va.
Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 509–10 (1990) (same).
158. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 228 (1979).
159. Id. at 239 n.18.
160. See, e.g., id. at 241 (“For example, statutory rights and obligations are often embedded in
complex regulatory schemes, so that if they are not enforced through private causes of action, they
may nevertheless be enforced through alternative mechanisms, such as criminal prosecutions, or
other public causes of actions.” (internal citations omitted)); Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Nat’l
Ass’n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 457 (1974) (holding that the power to vindicate rights rests
with the Attorney General).
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Passman Court held, in order to have a claim, one must have a cause of
action. 161 But again, cause of action is but a necessary, not a sufficient,
condition to having a claim. To be clear, the Passman Court uses cause
of action in the sense that a plaintiff is a member of a class entitled to
enforce rights in court, not in the sense that the term was used under the
former code and writ pleading schemes. Those older usages of the term
were rejected by the authors of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 162
Thus, in order to have a federal claim in this contemporary sense, a
plaintiff must: (1) assert a federal right; (2) be a member of the class of
persons entitled to enforce the right (i.e., assert a cause of action); and
(3) possess the other attributes of a claim, which means an assertion of a
transaction or occurrence that is sufficient, if true, to justify a remedy.
At least under contemporary judicial usage, the notion of claim
includes right and cause of action as definitional sub-components. This
judicial usage of claim in the § 1331 context makes an attempt to
divorce entirely claim from right and cause of action conceptually
impossible as the very notion of claim includes the concepts of a right
and cause of action as component parts. That is to say, one cannot assert
that a claim-based understanding of federal question jurisdiction escapes
assumed difficulties inherent in a rights-based or cause-of-action-based
construction of § 1331 jurisdiction because the former subsumes the
latter by definition. Indeed, even though Grossi intends for her view of
claim to differ from a rights-based or cause-of-action-based view, her
own definition of claim—which she states “is defined by reference to the
facts that establish a legal right to relief” 163—incorporates the concept of
right. In this regard, the claim-centric construction of § 1331 fails on its
own terms.
2.

Other Conceptions of a § 1331 Claim Are Not Fact Focused

Of course, claim as a concept is not always a false start in the § 1331
context. Mishkin famously forwarded the view that one of the primary
purposes of federal question jurisdiction in the district courts is to
protect federal rights, which often require a receptive forum to resolve
factual issues without the need to resolve unclear questions of federal
161. Passman, 442 U.S. at 239 (“If a litigant is an appropriate party to invoke the power of the
courts, it is said that he has a ‘cause of action’ under the statute, and that this cause of action is a
necessary element of his ‘claim.’”).
162. Id. at 237–39. But see Bellia, supra note 139, passim (arguing that the understanding of
cause of action as it was used under common law writ pleading illuminates the original meaning of
constitutional federal question jurisdiction).
163. Grossi, supra note 2, at 982 (emphasis added).
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law. 164 Mishkin’s point here was to reject the view that federal district
courts should be available in § 1331 cases only if the case presented an
open question of federal law that required resolution. 165 Thus, Mishkin
thought that § 1331 jurisdiction should be viewed as power over “federal
claims,” not just unresolved federal legal questions, so as to highlight
this purely fact-finding purpose. 166 But even in this context, Mishkin did
not contend that § 1331 jurisdiction vested in relation to facts alone.
Rather, in his view, so long as there is a federal right as an ingredient to
the case, the federal courts should stand ready to vindicate federal rights
even in purely fact-bound cases where the status of the federal law at
issue had been resolved in some prior case. 167 That is to say, Mishkin did
not take a fact-centric approach to the taking of federal question
jurisdiction as Grossi defines the term; rather, he held only that the
federal district courts should stand ready to serve solely as fact finders in
cases where federal rights are at issue.
Moreover, defining a § 1331 claim in transactional, res judicata terms
simply makes no sense. One of the points of a transactional approach to
claim preclusion (i.e., res judicata) is that the source of law the plaintiff
relies upon is immaterial to the preclusive effect of adjudicating the
original suit in relation to future filings. As Wright & Miller describes:
A second action may be precluded on the ground that the same
claim or cause of action was advanced in the first action even
though a different source of law is involved. Claim preclusion
may apply to theories advanced under different statutes, under
common law and statute, or under the laws of different
sovereigns. At one time it may have seemed that claim
preclusion would be limited by a requirement that the different
laws be designed to protect the same interests. Today, the
general transactional approach should be employed. The fact
that different sources of law are involved simply requires that
particular care be taken in addressing the questions raised by the
presence of different parties, continuing conduct, unduly
complex litigation, and jurisdictional limitations. 168
The notion, then, that § 1331 jurisdiction can be explained in terms of
164. Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal “Question” in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157,
169–76 (1953).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 171.
167. Id. at 170 (contrasting the roles that the district courts and Supreme Court play in relation to
federal question jurisdiction).
168. 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 49, § 4411.
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a fact-based conception of a res judicata claim is a non-starter. A claim
for res judicata purposes is indifferent to the source of law or legal
theory applied. Federal question jurisdiction, however, is decidedly not
indifferent to the source of the law or the legal theory applied. Indeed,
§ 1331 jurisdiction can only be determined in reference to the source of
law or legal theory applied, contrary to the way in which a res judicata
claim is deployed. For example, in 1970, before ERISA 169 was passed, a
suit by an employee for breach of contract in relation to an employee
benefit plan would not arise under § 1331. After the passage of ERISA,
such a suit does arise under § 1331. 170 This change in jurisdictional
outcome cannot be explained using the concept of a res judicata claim,
as the facts in both suits are the same by postulation. Rather it is a
change in the source of the law or legal theory—again notions irrelevant
to a res judicata claim—that explains the jurisdictional outcome.
A theory of § 1331 jurisdiction based upon a res judicata conception
of claim—one that is not supposed to be founded upon cause of action,
right, or other construction of federal legal interest, 171 but upon
“reference to the facts” as the notion of a claim is used “under the
modern law of res judicata”—must fail for several reasons. First, claim
in a res judicata sense is necessarily comparative. That is to say, a res
judicata conception of claim only makes sense in the context of asking
whether the same claim brought in suit number one is now brought in
suit number two. 172
In some jurisdictional settings this res judicata, claim-based approach
is sound. In 28 U.S.C. § 1367 supplemental jurisdiction, for example, the
courts rightly use a transactional notion of claim in making the decision
to take jurisdiction over pendent and ancillary claims by comparing
those supplemental claims to claims already before the federal court. 173
Section 1331 doctrine, however, must determine whether federal
question jurisdiction lies without comparison to some past suit or claim
169. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (Sept. 2, 1974).
170. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987) (holding common law causes of
action filed in state court preempted by ERISA which fell within scope of such provision were
removable to federal court under the well-pleaded complaint rule).
171. Grossi, supra note 2, at 982.
172. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (addressing “[w]hen a valid and final
judgment rendered in a [prior] action extinguishes the plaintiff’s [present] claim”).
173. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2012) (“[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original
jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so
related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case
or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.”).
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brought by the same plaintiff, rendering the comparative nature of the
approach inapt in this setting. Second, while the res judicata claim is
rightly a fact-focused concept, § 1331 jurisdictional doctrine must, as the
ERISA example illustrates, provide some means for determining when a
federal legal question is at stake. Merely focusing upon the facts of a
case will not accomplish this task. Rather, § 1331 doctrine must provide
some means—if not a right and/or cause of action, then some other legal
notion—of determining whether a federal legal question arises. As
discussed above, 174 the idea of arising under jurisdiction, as that concept
was imported from British law to American law, has always been a
legal, not a fact-focused, question. Grossi, moreover, implicitly
acknowledges as much, noting that the goal of § 1331 doctrine is to
determine whether a question of federal law is at issue. 175 This
acknowledgement, then, illustrates precisely why a res judicata
conception of claim simply cannot be the analytic unit that resolves this
jurisdictional issue. The analytic building block for § 1331 jurisdiction
must be a legal matter. Grossi, by rejecting right and cause of action and
defining claim in factual terms, fails to offer such a legally focused
starting point.
3.

Confusing Jurisdictional and On-The-Merits Dismissals

The claim-centered view, moreover, tempts us to take our eye off the
jurisdictional ball, which could well lead to unfortunate conflating of
concepts that would have real-world negative consequences. The
Passman Court’s presentation of claim as facts plus rights plus cause of
action is not only the blackletter view, but it makes sense within the
context of procedure writ more broadly as a means (not always
successful, to be sure) of distinguishing between jurisdictional and onthe-merits dismissals. 176 “As frequently happens where jurisdiction
depends on subject matter, the question [of] whether jurisdiction
174. See supra notes 140–45 and accompanying text.
175. Grossi, supra note 2, at 986 (“In other words, the goal is to determine whether resolution of
the plaintiff’s claim turns on a question of federal law.”).
176. See Douglas D. McFarland, The True Compass: No Federal Question in a State Law Claim,
55 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 27 n.160 (2006) (“Understanding the fact-based, transactional nature of a
claim is important throughout the federal rules and federal jurisdictional statutes. Kinship of the
‘claim’ to the commonly encountered ‘transaction or occurrence’ is apparent.”). On the other hand,
Professor John Oakley has attempted to distinguish causes of action from claims in the following
way: a cause of action should refer to “a transaction or occurrence,” and a claim for relief should
refer to “the legal theories upon which relief depends.” John B. Oakley, Federal Jurisdiction and
the Problem of the Litigative Unit: When Does What “Arise Under” Federal Law?, 76 TEX. L. REV.
1829, 1858–59 (1998).
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exists . . . [is often] confused with the question whether the complaint
states a cause of action[, which the Federal Rules now refer to as a
claim].” 177 But as the Court has often held,
[j]urisdiction . . . is not defeated . . . by the possibility that the
averments might fail to state a cause of action on which
petitioners could actually recover . . . . [because] the failure to
state a proper cause of action[, which the Federal Rules refers to
as a claim] calls for a judgment on the merits. 178
Indeed, even in cases of federal question jurisdiction, proper subject
matter jurisdiction vests a federal court with the power to decide both
successful and unsuccessful suits. 179 Although the Supreme Court’s
admonishments never to conflate these two concepts are well intended,
many lower federal courts are quick to note that “[w]hile distinguishing
between a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule
12(b)(1) and a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6)
appears straightforward in theory, it is often much more difficult in
practice.” 180 Constructing a theory of subject matter jurisdiction upon a
transactional, fact-centered approach to claim would only make this
already difficult distinction nearly untenable.
Moreover, preserving this distinction matters—a lot. The standard
view of the distinction between jurisdictional and merits dismissals
employs both formal and pragmatic distinctions between the two
concepts. On the formalities side, subject matter jurisdiction speaks to a

177. Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Nw. Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 249 (1951); see also Fogel
v. Chestnutt, 668 F.2d 100, 105–07 (2d Cir. 1981) (Friendly, J.) (providing an insightful discussion
of the standard view).
178. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946); see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t,
523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (“It is firmly established in our cases that the absence of a valid (as opposed
to arguable) cause of action does not implicate subject matter jurisdiction, i.e., the courts’ statutory
or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.”); Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 476 n.5 (1979)
(similar); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 71–72 (1978) (similar);
Montana-Dakota Util., 341 U.S. at 249 (similar).
179. The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913).
180. Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 1187 (2d Cir. 1996); see also
Primax Recoveries, Inc. v. Gunter, 433 F.3d 515, 517 (6th Cir. 2006); Estate of Harshman v.
Jackson Hole Mountain Resort Corp., 379 F.3d 1161, 1166 (10th Cir. 2004); Carlson v. Principal
Fin. Grp., 320 F.3d 301, 305–06 (2d Cir. 2003); Schwenker v. Molalla River Sch. Dist. No. 35, No.
06-506-ST, 2006 WL 3019828, at *3 (D. Or. Oct 19, 2006); Joshua Schwartz, Note, Limiting Steel
Co.: Recapturing a Broader “Arising Under” Jurisdictional Question, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2255,
2261 (2004) (noting that “[c]ourts are often hard pressed to define the difference between
jurisdiction and the merits and have been forced to concede that . . . ‘[the distinction] is often much
more difficult [to make] in practice’”) (quoting Nowak, 81 F.3d at 1187); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS: Subject Matter Jurisdiction § 11 cmt. e (1982) (“[Q]uestion[s often] can plausibly
be characterized either as going to subject matter jurisdiction or as being one of merits . . . .”).
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court’s ability to resolve claims and defenses in either the affirmative or
negative. 181 A failure to state a claim, by contrast, presupposes that a
court has power to resolve a case but that the plaintiff’s complaint
contains some sort of legal infirmity or pleading defect on its face. 182
Under the standard view, in a federal-question jurisdiction case, the issue
of subject matter jurisdiction is both analytically distinct from, 183 and
prior to, 184 the issue of the plaintiff’s ability to state a claim in the
181. See Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868) (“Jurisdiction is power to declare
the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing
the fact and dismissing the cause.”); Evan Tsen Lee, The Dubious Concept of Jurisdiction, 54
HASTINGS L.J. 1613, 1620 (2003) (arguing that jurisdiction is “a matter of something like legitimate
authority”); Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction and Merits, 80 WASH. L. REV. 643, 670–78
(2005); Alex Lees, Note, The Jurisdictional Label: Use and Misuse, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1457, 1470–
77 (2006) (listing the three major theories which seek to explain the concept of jurisdiction as
power, legitimacy, and legislative control).
182. See, e.g., Bell, 327 U.S. at 682 (“Jurisdiction . . . is not defeated . . . by the possibility that
the averments might fail to state a cause of action on which petitioners could actually recover.”); 5B
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 49, § 1356 (discussing purpose of Rule 12(b)(6) motions).
183. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198–200 (1962) (discussing the fundamental
difference between a dismissal on the merits and a jurisdictional dismissal); Ehm v. Nat’l R.R.
Passenger Corp., 732 F.2d 1250, 1257 (5th Cir. 1984) (“A dismissal under both rule 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6) has a ‘fatal inconsistency’ and cannot stand. ‘Federal jurisdiction is not so ambidextrous as
to permit a district court to dismiss a suit for want of jurisdiction with one hand and to decide the
merits with the other. A federal district court concluding lack of jurisdiction should apply its brakes,
cease and desist the proceedings, and shun advisory opinions. To do otherwise would be in defiance
of its jurisdictional fealty.’” (quoting Opelika Nursing Home, Inc. v. Richardson, 448 F.2d 658, 667
(5th Cir. 1971))); Johnsrud v. Carter, 620 F.2d 29, 32–33 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that “[d]ismissal
on jurisdictional grounds and for failure to state a claim are analytically distinct . . . , implicating
different legal principles” and different burdens of proof); John Birch Soc. v. Nat’l Broadcasting
Co., 377 F.2d 194, 197 n.3 (2d Cir. 1967) (affirming only on 12(b)(1) grounds when the district
court dismissed the case on the grounds of a failure to state a claim and lack of subject matter
jurisdiction because “[t]he dismissal of these actions on jurisdictional grounds should not be
construed to imply affirmance of the substantive grounds for dismissal adopted by the District
Court”); cf. Valentin v. Hosp. Bella Vista, 254 F.3d 358, 364 (1st Cir. 2001) (“It is pellucid that a
trial court’s approach to a Rule 12(b)(1) motion which asserts a factual challenge is quite different
from its approach to a motion for summary judgment.”); Winslow v. Walters, 815 F.2d 1114, 1116
(7th Cir. 1987) (“Seeking summary judgment on a jurisdictional issue, therefore, is the equivalent of
asking a court to hold that because it has no jurisdiction the plaintiff has lost on the merits. This is a
nonsequitur.”).
184. See, e.g., Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 94–95 (holding that the notion of hypothetical jurisdiction is
contrary to law); Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800 (1988); Mansfield, C. &
L.M. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884) (noting that “the first and fundamental question is
that of jurisdiction, first, of this court, and then of the court from which the record comes”); The
Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247, 250 (1867) (holding that “[i]f there were no jurisdiction,
there was no power to do anything but strike the case from the docket”); Deniz v. Municipality of
Guaynabo, 285 F.3d 142, 149 (1st Cir. 2002) (“When a court is confronted with motions to dismiss
under both Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), it ordinarily ought to decide the former before broaching
the latter.”); Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001); Gould, Inc. v. Pechiney
Ugine Kuhlmann, 853 F.2d 445, 450 (6th Cir. 1988); Jones v. Georgia, 725 F.2d 622, 623 (11th Cir.
1984) (“When a district court has pending before it both a 12(b)(1) motion and a 12(b)(6) motion,
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transactional, fact-laden sense that Grossi employs. As such, a 12(b)(1)
motion serves a distinctly different purpose from a 12(b)(6) motion. The
former is, by and large, 185 a modern equivalent of a plea in abatement. 186
A 12(b)(1) motion, then, does not attack the merits of the plaintiff’s
claim or sufficiency of the pleadings, but merely the propriety of the
federal forum. 187 By challenging the propriety of the federal forum, the
movant necessarily argues that the federal court lacks the power under
either the Constitution or laws of the United States to hear the case.188 A
12(b)(6) motion, by contrast, is the modern equivalent of a demurrer. 189
Again in contrast to a jurisdictional challenge, the 12(b)(6) motion
speaks to the merits of the claim (i.e., do the facts as pleaded provide
legal relief 190) or the plaintiff’s conformity to Rule 8(a)(2). 191
While a coherent theory of § 1331 should assist in distinguishing
between jurisdictional and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

the generally preferable approach, if the 12(b)(1) motion essentially challenges the existence of a
federal cause of action, is for the court to find jurisdiction and then decide the 12(b)(6) motion.”).
185. A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction can merely attack the sufficiency
of the jurisdictional statement required by Rule 8(a)(1). See 5C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 49,
§ 1363. But such dismissals are not the focus of the present discussion.
186. Wasserman, supra note 181, at 649–53 (discussing the “first phase” of litigation where
jurisdictional questions are properly addressed); 5B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 49, § 1349 (“Rules
12(b)(1) through 12(b)(5) and 12(b)(7) essentially are defenses to the district court’s ability to
proceed with the action. They are modern counterparts to the common law pleas in abatement and
do not go to the merits of a claim.”).
187. 5B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 49, § 1349; BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1172 (7th ed. 1999).
188. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 n.18 (1979) (describing subject matter jurisdiction as
the power of the court); see also supra note 6. Congress retains broad control of the jurisdiction of
the inferior federal courts, and it may grant a narrower scope of subject matter jurisdiction than is
found in Article III. See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, Congressional Power Over the Jurisdiction of the
Federal Courts, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1030 (1982) (espousing the traditional view that Congress is not
required by Article III to vest full constitutional subject matter jurisdiction in the inferior federal
courts). Contra Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of
Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 209 (1985) (arguing that Congress must vest some of the
Article III heads of jurisdiction in the federal judiciary). See also Laurence Tribe, Jurisdictional
Gerrymandering: Zoning Disfavored Rights Out of the Federal Courts, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
129 (1981) (arguing that there are non-Article III limits to Congress’s discretion in vesting inferior
federal courts with subject matter jurisdiction). Exercising this control over inferior courts,
Congress withheld general federal question jurisdiction from them until 1875. See Judiciary Act of
March 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470.
189. 5B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 49, § 1349 (“Rule 12(b)(6) is the successor of the common
law demurrer and the code motion to dismiss and is a method of testing the sufficiency of the
statement of the claim for relief.”).
190. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (“[W]e hold that stating such
a claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that [a statutory
violation occurred].”).
191. Id.

11 - Mulligan Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

6/6/2014 12:17 PM

478

[Vol. 89:441

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

dismissals, reverting to a claim-centered view of § 1331 jurisdiction only
exacerbates this problem. Such a transactional, fact-centered approach
invites increased conflation of jurisdictional dismissals with on-themerits ones. This distinction is not merely a formalist one, but one that
produces important pragmatic consequences. 192 First, treating an issue as
jurisdictional has the consequence of generally raising the issue at the
outset of the litigation process. 193 Despite this early treatment,
jurisdictional issues, unlike a 12(b)(6) motion, 194 are unwaivable and
must be raised sua sponte by the court. 195 Factual findings related to
jurisdiction, unlike the presumption of truthfulness a well-pleaded
complaint enjoys in a 12(b)(6) motion, 196 are often made by the court
and subject to deferential review on appeal. 197 Furthermore, the party
alleging jurisdiction, not the movant, bears the burden of establishing
subject matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. 198
Because of the fundamental nature of subject matter jurisdiction, a
judgment on the merits issued by a court lacking jurisdiction is ultra
vires without any binding power. 199 Similarly, jurisdictional dismissals,
unlike the general treatment for 12(b)(6) dismissals, 200 are not judgments
on the merits and, therefore, are dismissals without prejudice,201 which
are not subject to res judicata doctrine, 202 except on the narrow issue of
192. See generally Wasserman, supra note 181, at 662–69.
193. See, e.g., id. at 662; Perry Dane, Jurisdictionality, Time, and the Legal Imagination, 23
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 47 (1994).
194. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(2).
195. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006); United States
v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002) (“[S]ubject matter jurisdiction, because it involves the court’s
power to hear a case, can never be forfeited or waived.”); Dane, supra note 193, at 36–37.
196. See, e.g., Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 171 (2005); Summit Health,
Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 325 (1991).
197. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514 (“[I]f subject-matter jurisdiction turns on contested facts, the trial
judge may be authorized to review the evidence and resolve the dispute on her own.”); Wasserman,
supra note 181, at 662.
198. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1); Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442, 446 (1942) (amount in
controversy in diversity action); Chayoon v. Chao, 355 F.3d 141, 143 (2d Cir. 2004) (sovereign
immunity of Indian tribe); Hedgepeth v. Tennessee, 215 F.3d 608, 611 (6th Cir. 2000); Marcus v.
Kansas Dep’t of Revenue, 170 F.3d 1305, 1309 (10th Cir. 1999).
199. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998); Dane, supra note 193, at
32–35.
200. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 399 n.3 (1981); see also FED. R. CIV.
P. 41(b).
201. See, e.g., Vandor, Inc. v. Militello, 301 F.3d 37, 38–39 (2d Cir. 2002); Mo. Soybean Ass’n
v. EPA, 289 F.3d 509, 513 (8th Cir. 2002); Leaf v. Sup. Ct. of Wis., 979 F.2d 589, 595 (7th Cir.
1992).
202. Dane, supra note 193, at 42.
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the jurisdictional ruling itself. 203 Finally, a dismissal for want of
jurisdiction will also divest a federal court of pendent jurisdiction over
plaintiff’s related state-law claims. 204
In sum, the claim-focused approach to § 1331 jurisdiction, seen as a
res judicata construct, faces many problems, especially if such a reading
is presumed to follow as an interpretation of Gully. First, Gully itself, as
properly interpreted, speaks in terms of rights, and not claims. Second, a
transactional claim preclusion construction of claim is anachronistic as
an interpretation of Gully. Third, the Court’s contemporary usage of the
term claim in a § 1331 setting subsumes the notions of right and cause of
action. Fourth, other uses of claim in the § 1331 context, such as
Mishkin’s, do not employ a res judicata construction of the idea because
§ 1331 jurisprudence must speak to federal sources of law, not simply
facts. And fifth, Grossi’s approach tends to conflate jurisdictional
dismissals with on-the-merits dismissals.
III. GULLY AS JURISDICTIONAL PRAGMATISM
Relying on Gully, I have argued, neither comports with legal-processschool norms nor is it helpfully amenable to re-construction in terms of a
res judicata-like claim. Rather than a celebration of the legal process
school, this Gully-inspired approach seems more a bow to a pragmatic
approach to § 1331 jurisdiction. To this end, I lastly consider the Gullyinspired view as a type of pragmatism, read in light of Grossi’s primary
thesis as a call for judges simply to select sufficiently important matters,
in relation to plaintiff’s case in chief, for inclusion in federal question
jurisdiction. I address this aspect of the Gully approach as a part of the
current debate that questions whether simplicity or complexity in
jurisdictional rules present the best course. 205 Viewed from this
203. Ricketts v. Midwest Nat’l Bank, 874 F.2d 1177, 1182 n.4 (7th Cir. 1989); Magnus
Electronics, Inc. v. Argentina, 830 F.2d 1396, 1400 (7th Cir. 1987); Bromwell v. Mich. Mut. Ins.
Co., 115 F.3d 208, 212–13 (3d Cir. 1997); Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Tonawanda Band of
Seneca Indians, 94 F.3d 747, 754 (2d Cir. 1996); 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 49, § 4403.
204. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263,
285 (1993); Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 817 n.15 (1986); Hagans v.
Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 545–50 (1974).
205. Compare Dodson, supra note 46 (in a leading article in this topic, arguing that clarity in
jurisdictional law is often over-valued), with Rory Ryan, It’s Just Not Worth Searching for Welcome
Mats with A Kaleidoscope and A Broken Compass, 75 TENN. L. REV. 659, 661 (2008) (agreeing
with “Justice Holmes and his growing fan club . . . . [that while s]impler may not always (or even
often) be better . . . it is in this [§ 1331] context.”). I have weighed in briefly on this matter. Lumen
N. Mulligan, Clear Rules—Not Necessarily Simple or Accessible Ones, 97 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 13,
13 (2011) (arguing that “a clarity-enhancing rule, even if complex and inaccessible, may be a more
promising endeavor than the search for a regime that is at once clear, simple, and accessible”)
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perspective, I conclude that this pragmatic view fails in the § 1331
context as prompting simplicity to the detriment of clarity.
It is useful, I suggest, to consider this Gully approach to § 1331 as
part of a large dialogue regarding the role of clarity and simplicity in
jurisdictional regimes. On one side of this debate, scholars such as
Professor John Preis contend that “[j]ust about nobody, it seems, thinks
that jurisdictional rules should be fuzzy.” 206 Following this line, thinkers
such as Professor Rory Ryan argue for
[t]he
Holmes
test . . . [and
its]
narrow . . . bright
lines . . . . [which n]o doubt, at the fringes . . . will exclude some
cases that seem to be proper candidates for initial resolution in
federal court. Bright-line rules will do that. In this context, it’s
worth it. 207
The Gully view, read as a call for judges simply to select sufficiently
important matters for inclusion in federal question jurisdiction, in
relation to plaintiff’s case in chief, takes the opposite pole in calling for a
pragmatic approach to vesting § 1331 jurisdiction. 208
I begin, then, with the concept of pragmatism. By pragmatism I mean
a jurisprudence “with its ideal of decisionmaking that ‘works’ and
achieves satisfactory results” 209 without fleshing out any further
doctrinal detail justifying these “right” results. A call to reconstruct
§ 1331 law as individual judges determining when a case is sufficiently
important to warrant federal jurisdiction210 full stop, at least in my view,
seems best interpreted as just such a call for decisionmaking that
“works.” To be sure, pragmatism, especially in equity matters, is often
the proper course. 211 But just as often, “‘pragmatism’ is an honorific title
for wooliness masquerading alternately as profundity and common

[hereinafter Mulligan, Clear Rules].
206. Preis, supra note 41, at 167.
207. Ryan, supra note 205, at 663.
208. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (noting that functionalist jurisdictional theories
may be characterized as pragmatic approaches).
209. Fallon, supra note 100, at 16–17.
210. Grossi, supra note 2, at 1009.
211. See, e.g., Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649–50 (2010) (“[W]e have also made clear that
often the ‘exercise of a court’s equity powers . . . must be made on a case-by-case basis.’ In
emphasizing the need for ‘flexibility,’ for avoiding ‘mechanical rules,’ we have followed a tradition
in which courts of equity have sought to ‘relieve hardships which, from time to time, arise from a
hard and fast adherence’ to more absolute legal rules, which, if strictly applied, threaten the ‘evils of
archaic rigidity.’ The ‘flexibility’ inherent in ‘equitable procedure’ enables courts ‘to meet new
situations [that] demand equitable intervention, and to accord all the relief necessary to
correct . . . particular injustices.’” (alterations in original) (internal citations omitted)).
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sense. Without fuller elaboration, ‘pragmatism’ [often] is not a helpful
answer to any practical question.” 212
Engagement with this broader discussion of jurisdictional simplicity
versus clarity requires some further definitional refinement. I contend
that three related concepts—simplicity, clarity, and accessibility—must
be understood and deployed to enrich this discussion. I cast the quest for
simple jurisdictional rules as the search for noncomplex ones. A leading
definition of legal complexity is defined along at least two axes: density
and institutional differentiation. 213 Dense regimes are those systems with
numerous and widely encompassing rules or standards. And
institutionally differentiated regimes are ones in which varying types of
decisionmaking processes and bodies are used. A rule is simple, then, to
the degree it lacks density and differentiation. Clarity presents itself as a
distinct concept. Clarity, which I also define by way of contrast, is the
opposite of indeterminacy. Indeterminate legal rules and standards are
those that produce unpredictable outcomes ex ante. That is to say, clear
regimes are those that lend themselves to the production of predictable
outcomes prior to litigation. Indeed, clarity is most often understood at
law in terms of predictability ex ante. 214 Accessibility presents yet a third
notion. Accessible regimes are those that are not technical, meaning they
do not rely upon rules or standards that require expertise and specialized
sophistication to deploy. By accessibility I mean the ease with which the
substance of a rule is understandable by non-experts. 215 A legal regime,

212. Fallon, supra note 100, at 17.
213. Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences and Cures, 42 DUKE L.J.
1, 3 (1992). Professor Schuck also includes third and fourth “complexity” concepts: technicality and
indeterminacy. But he notes that indeterminacy may equally well be seen as a consequence of, as
opposed to an element of, complexity. Id. at 4 (“Indeterminacy’s relation to legal complexity is
itself complex. . . . Indeterminacy, then, may be a consequence, as well as a defining feature, of
complexity.”). As I attempt to illustrate below, the notions of technicality and indeterminacy appear
to more readily map on to notions distinct from complexity, and I differ slightly from Schuck and
use it in this sense. Also, I do not suggest this take on complexity is the unequivocal definition.
Others, for instance, have defined procedural simplicity in terms of aesthetic attraction. See Janice
Toran, ‘Tis a Gift to be Simple: Aesthetics and Procedural Reform, 89 MICH. L. REV. 352, 356
(1990).
214. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 639–40 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“In the
past we have attempted to justify our embarrassing Establishment Clause jurisprudence on the
ground that it ‘sacrifices clarity and predictability for flexibility.’” (citation and footnote omitted));
2009 Term Leading Cases, 124 HARV. L. REV. 309, 317 (2010) (discussing clarity in predictive
terms); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Limiting Article III Standing to “Accidental” Plaintiffs: Lessons from
Environmental and Animal Cases, 45 GA. L. REV. 1, 9 (2010) (similar); Abbe R. Gluck, The States
as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified
Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1856 (2010) (similar).
215. Cf. Schuck, supra note 213, at 3.
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then, might be simple and accessible yet unclear, or complex and
inaccessible yet clear, and so on.
Armed with these concepts, I take us back to the Gully and § 1331
doctrine. Grossi sums up the Gully approach in the following way:
The only policy reflected in Justice Cardozo’s analysis is one of
careful judgment in determining whether the role played by the
federal question in the claim is sufficiently important to justify
the exercise of jurisdiction. Thus, the entire analysis focuses on
a durable principle, and no mechanistic test or formula can
improve on that. Rather, as indicated by Justice Cardozo, a
mechanical approach carries the risk of creating doctrinal
labyrinths which there is no exit. 216
Using terms with a bit of precision, as outlined above, I believe that
Grossi’s view of § 1331 jurisdiction has the virtue of simplicity. It is
neither dense nor institutionally differentiated. It requires only a judge to
make a singular determination. Further, it presents an accessible concept
to non-experts in that it avoids technical rules or standards. Indeed, her
view is readily explainable as a general proposition. Grossi’s view,
however, lacks clarity (i.e., it does not produce results that are
predictable ex ante). Grossi’s protestations to the contrary, 217 it is
unassailably the overwhelming consensus that the Gully kaleidoscopic
approach leads to unclear—meaning unpredictable ex ante—§ 1331
doctrine. 218
But finding that the Gully-based view is not clarity enhancing is not a
strike against the view per se. Indeed, it is only when such
unpredictability creates net-systemic costs that a lack of clarity should be
avoided. Thus, following Professor Scott Dodson, I agree that
jurisdictional clarity is but an instrumental value that promotes, to
varying degrees, three competing core norms: (1) decreased costs to
216. Grossi, supra note 2, at 1009.
217. Id. (quoting Gully v. First Nat’l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 118 (1936), and arguing that it offers
clear guidance by referencing claims); see also supra note 104 and accompanying text (discussing
this issue).
218. See Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 822 n.1 (1986) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (“[I]f one makes the test sufficiently vague and general, virtually any set of results can
be ‘reconciled’ [with it post hoc].”). Professor Rory Ryan similarly notes that “Justice Cardozo
directed us to evaluate the kaleidoscopic situations to find the substantial issues. Factors are
articulated for analyzing the substantiality inquiry, but the factors are as amorphous as the overall
test.” Ryan, supra note 205, at 674. Justice Brennan and Professor Ryan have a lot of company in
reaching this conclusion about the Gully standard. See Ryan, supra note 205, at 659 n.4 (offering an
impressive list of scholarship on this point, providing scores of articles ranging over seven decades).
An inability to create clear results ex ante is a standard feature of functionalist, or pragmatic,
jurisdictional approaches. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing this point).
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litigants and courts; (2) enhanced legitimacy of the judiciary; and (3)
promotion of inter-governmental relations by demarcating lines of
authority for trial and appellate courts, state and federal court systems,
and judicial and legislative power. 219 Thus, clarity should trump the
other related norms of simplicity and accessibility only if, in context, the
value of such trade-offs produces a net gain.
In many contexts, accessibility or simplicity may outweigh the norm
of clarity. For example, take the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to grant
certiorari from the state court systems under 28 U.S.C. § 1257. The
Court’s interpretation of the term “finality” in this statute is malleable at
best, leading to unclear and unpredictable results. 220 Unlike original
district court jurisdiction, however—where the finding of jurisdiction,
abstention excepted, leads to the court hearing the case, assuming
personal jurisdiction, venue, and service—the existence of the Supreme
Court’s appellate jurisdiction under § 1257 is merely a precursor to the
main event of the exercise of its discretion to issue a writ of certiorari.
Given the discretionary nature of case selection at the Supreme Court,
clear jurisdictional rules under § 1257 are not likely to enhance the
legitimacy of the Court’s decisionmaking process, 221 or reduce litigant
costs. Moreover, given the hierarchical nature of the Supreme Court visà-vis the state-court systems, a more unpredictable “threat” of Supreme
Court review might further federalism considerations as much as hinder
them. 222 Jurisdictional clarity in this context, then, is unlikely to foster
any of the three values upon which it is grounded. As such, there is little
reason to pursue it as an end in the § 1257 setting.
Interestingly, Grossi’s approach would appear to be much more at
home as an interpretation of § 1257 doctrine as opposed to § 1331
jurisprudence. The Supreme Court in its earlier § 1331 cases often
crafted § 1331 opinions by inappropriately borrowing from analyses of
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction. 223 As Professor William Cohen

219. See Dodson, supra note 46, at 45–49.
220. See id. at 41–42.
221. See, e.g., Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years
After the Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1713–30 (2000) (questioning whether certiorari is
consistent with the traditional conceptions of judicial review, the nature of judicial power, and the
rule of law).
222. See id. at 1731–32 (arguing the selective application of Supreme Court review of state courts
as aiding the development of selective incorporation doctrine); Dodson, supra note 46, at 48–49.
223. LARRY W. YACKLE, RECLAIMING THE FEDERAL COURTS 91 (1994) (lamenting Supreme
Court doctrine that “needlessly confuse[s] matters with outdated jargon and misleading
generalizations,” and advocating “jurisdictional rules that can easily be applied at the outset of
litigation”). Further, many of these stock phrases were inappropriately transferred from old cases
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pointed out in his classic 1967 work, all the key phrases in Gully (which
Grossi relies upon to craft her theory) are “uncritically transferred, in
earlier cases, from the standard which appropriately governs the
Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction.” 224 The claim-construction of
federal question, then, could well fit any number of legal process norms
and “simplicity vs. clarity” norms in the § 1257 context.
Section 1331 cases, however, are different. This is not to say that
pointless formalism rules the day. Indeed, making a decision within a
formalist framework is not inherently bad. 225 Rather, it is simply a
means of constraining a decisionmaker. 226 Whether this is a sound
course must be viewed contextually by weighing the benefits of
formalistic reasoning, typically predictability (or what I call clarity),
against its costs. 227 From this point of view, jurisdictional formalism is
akin to rule utilitarianism. Under rule utilitarianism, “[i]nstead of
[evaluating] individual decision procedures [at each moment of
decisionmaking], we evaluate codes of . . . rules.” 228 The rule-based, as
opposed to the case-by-case, method is then preferable to the degree that
all things considered including transaction costs of a case-by-case
method, the rule-based approach produces better outcomes. 229 In the
§ 1331 setting, then, the question would be does the Gully, pragmatic
approach further essential separation of power norms, federalism norms,
clarity norms, and the like better than its competitors, such as by
congressional intent by way of rights and causes of action view. 230
My aim in this article has been to show that the Gully approach fails
in this regard. I have previously argued that, in the § 1331 setting, it is
involving appellate jurisdiction, rendering their use in the § 1331 context highly suspect. See
William Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement that a Case Arise “Directly” Under
Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 890, 904 (1967); Mishkin, supra note 164, at 160–63.
224. Cohen, supra note 223, at 904.
225. Schauer, supra note 42, at 543 (“In sum, it is clearly true that rules get in the way, but this
need not always be considered a bad thing.”).
226. Id. at 537–38.
227. Id. at 540.
228. TIM MULGAN, UNDERSTANDING UTILITARIANISM 120 (2007); accord David O. Brink,
Mill’s Ambivalence About Rights, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1669, 1671 (2010).
229. Brink, supra note 228, at 1671–73.
230. This weighing of these benefits, moreover, must be seen against understanding that selecting
a formalist or pragmatic decision regime is not an either-or proposition. See Schauer, supra note 42,
at 547 (“Under such a theory of presumptive formalism there would be a presumption in favor of
the result generated by the literal and largely acontextual interpretation of the most locally
applicable rule.”). I conceive of my approach to § 1331 jurisdiction, which uses the formalistic
notions of rights and causes of action within a setting of differing standards, as just such a hybrid
approach. But a fuller discussion of this notion is beyond the scope of this piece.
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clarity—not necessarily simplicity or accessibility—that is of the highest
value. 231 Such a prioritization, moreover, is consistent with the legal
process school. “[G]ood legal reasons, as defined by the [Legal Process]
paradigm, should provide at least some bases (though frequently
indeterminate ones) on which to predict the outcomes of authoritative
decisionmaking.” 232 The Gully view of § 1331 jurisdiction falls short on
this predictability ex ante score, with little else beyond simplicity as a
counterbalance. In short, this pragmatic, claim-centered approach to
determining when federal question jurisdiction vests in the district courts
fails because “pragmatism as an unelaborated concept affords no answer
to the fundamental Legal Process question of who should have what
power to make authoritative judgments—pragmatic or otherwise—on
behalf of the legal system.” 233 But these are precisely the questions that a
viable § 1331 doctrine must answer.
CONCLUSION
Professor Grossi’s call to return to our legal-process-school traditions
represents an important and powerful contribution to the field.
Nevertheless, her invitation to re-imagine § 1331 jurisdiction via Gully
as a call for judges simply to select sufficiently important matters, in
relation to plaintiff’s case in chief, for inclusion in federal question
jurisdiction or in terms of res judicata claims holds less appeal. Most
fundamentally, the Gully view does not have a unique affinity to legalprocess-school foundations. To the contrary, the legal process school
supports a rights and causes of action approach, as understood as a
means of effectuating the principle of congressional control over lower
federal court jurisdiction. Moreover, claim as a notion is both inaccurate
and anachronistic as an interpretation of Gully. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court’s contemporary use of the term claim subsumes the very
notions of right and cause of action that the claim-centric view aims to
avoid. And a claim-centered view is likely to cause more practical
troubles than solve interpretive difficulties. Ultimately, this Gully view
seems more at home as a species of jurisdictional pragmatism than as an
exemplar of the legal-process school.

231. Mulligan, Clear Rules, supra note 205, at 17.
232. Fallon, supra note 100, at 10.
233. Id. at 17.

